Corporate NPL portfolios in CESEE countries: how coprorate leverage and debt spillovers affect firm performance by Damijan, Joze
  
Corporate NPL portfolios in CESEE 
countries: how corporate leverage and 
debt spillovers affect firm performance  
Jože P. Damijan 
Abstract 
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1. Introduction 
In most of central, eastern and south-eastern Europe (CESEE), private growth and 
investment is still hampered by persistent financial distress in the corporate sector, as 
underlined in the recent IMF publication Regional Economic Issues (IMF, 2015). The 
corporate sector in most CESEE countries took on excessive debt before the 2008 crisis, 
exposing them to the pressure of having to realign their debt levels in the aftermath of the 
crisis. This resulted in a typical balance sheet recession with simultaneous and painful 
deleveraging, which not only aggravated the overall economic downturn but also worsened 
the prospect of economic recovery. The IMF report shows that seven years into the crisis the 
debt problem in many CESEE countries is still pervasive, mostly because the institutional 
frameworks required to ensure a timely and smooth deleveraging were lacking or inefficient. 
The obvious way to see how unsustainable debt and limited access to credit affect firm 
performance is to assess the macroeconomic importance of overleveraged firms in terms of 
employment, sales, investment, exports and so on. This approach, however, underestimates 
the true impact of overleveraged firms on aggregate performance of the economies. One 
important aspect that was largely overlooked in the literature when dealing with overall 
financial distress is the skewed distribution of excessive debt in corporate sectors and its 
impact on the economy. As shown by Damijan (2014) for Slovenia, and as demonstrated in 
section 3 of this paper, the 300 most indebted companies in CESEE on average account for 
two-thirds of the total corporate debt overhang, contribute about one-sixth of aggregate value 
added, and one-eighth of aggregate employment. Though these figures constitute a non-
negligible overall effect of most indebted companies on overall macroeconomic 
performance, it is also important to consider the potential indirect effects of these large 
financially distressed companies on upstream and downstream companies in the national 
value chains. This may considerably alter the overall macroeconomic importance of the top 
debtor firms and provide some further justification for preferential treatment of the top 30, 
top 50 or top 100 debtor firms in terms of financial restructuring. 
This aspect becomes even more important in view of the recent advances in empirical 
analysis and theory of firm dynamics. While standard theory assumes balanced economies 
where all sectors play roughly symmetric roles as input suppliers to others and where all 
microeconomic fluctuations are averaged out, recent research shows that when sectors and 
firms are heterogeneous in terms of size, idiosyncratic microeconomic shocks can lead to a 
larger macroeconomic downturn than what is predicted under assumptions of a normal 
distribution. There is a fast-growing body of research showing that when the firm size 
distribution is “fat-tailed”1 idiosyncratic shocks to large firms contribute more to aggregate 
fluctuations (see Gabaix, 2011; Acemoglu et al., 2012, 2015; Di Giovanni et al., 2014). 
Bernanke et al. (1996) highlight the “small shocks, large cycles puzzle” interaction between 
the input-output structure and the shape of the distribution of microeconomic shocks as an 
important potential explanation of the aggregate volatility.  
                                                        
1
 That is, when firm size is not normally distributed, but few firms dominate the output by sectors. 
Acemoglu et al. (2015) show that the propagation mechanism of microeconomic shocks 
works through input-output linkages between sectors and firms. In an unbalanced economy, 
where some sectors and/or companies play a much more important role than others as input 
suppliers or buyers to the rest of the economy, microeconomic shocks to individual 
companies or sectors can lead to the emergence of significant macroeconomic fluctuations. 
In other words, the frequency of large GDP contractions can be highly sensitive to the nature 
of micro shocks. Damijan et al. (2016) show how a demand shock affecting a large 
Slovenian company quickly spreads through the network of its suppliers, creating several 
rounds of first- and second-order adverse effects along the supply chain. Furthermore, Kelly 
et al. (2013) develop a network model of firm volatility in which larger suppliers have more 
customers. They show that network effects are essential in explaining the joint evolution of 
the empirical firm size and firm volatility distributions.  
Hence, when a fraction of larger companies in an economy is burdened by excessive debt 
and facing significant credit constraints and when this period of financial distress is 
protracted, this may have disproportionately large adverse effects on the whole economy. 
Depending on their size and intensity of the input-output linkages with the rest of the 
economy, financially distressed firms pose a potentially significant macroeconomic risk due 
to their inability to provide services or products to their upstream customers or to meet 
financial obligations to their downstream suppliers.  
Due to the network effects, the occurrence of financially distressed large firms may play a 
similar role in the propagation of the crisis as systemic banks burdened by the large shares of 
non-performing loans (NPLs) in their portfolios. It is hence essential to study the network 
effects of such “systemically important” companies in the economy and to what extent their 
financial health / distress affects the rest of the economy.  
The research in this paper has three main objectives. We aim to: 
 study the extent of corporate sector excess leverage in CESEE economies 
 identify the largest and “systemically important” companies that are most severely 
burdened by excessive debt 
 analyse their impact on the performance of vertically linked downstream and 
upstream firms.  
The first objective provides an assessment of the extent of corporate sector excess leverage 
by country. For the second objective we identify groups of the largest companies (from the 
top 10 to top 300) with regard to their excess leverage, and assess their direct 
macroeconomic importance in terms of debt, employment, value added and exports. And for 
the third objective we estimate a debt spillovers model to assess the indirect effects of 
financial distress on horizontally and vertically linked industries. The model is estimated 
using firm-level data for five CESEE countries (Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Romania and 
Serbia) for the period 2005-14. Finally, we use coefficients estimated by the model to 
simulate indirect impact of reducing the excessive debt held by the 100 and 300 largest 
debtor firms on sales, employment and investment of vertically linked companies. 
These are the major findings of our paper. 
 Corporate sectors in six CESEE countries are burdened with a large extent of excessive 
debt. On average, 29 per cent of firms are characterised by excess leverage (defined as 
(net debt – EBITDA) > 4). In four countries this ratio of firms with excessive debt 
leverage is even bigger, ranging between 31 per cent (Montenegro) and 42 per cent 
(Serbia). 
 Corporate net debt and excessive debt are highly concentrated across CESSE economies. 
On average across six CESEE countries, the 20 largest debtor companies account for 
almost 30 per cent of total debt overhang, while the top 100 and top 300 companies 
account for almost one half and two-thirds of overall excessive debt, respectively. 
Bulgaria, Hungary and Serbia reveal the largest concentration of excessive debt, with the 
10 most indebted companies holding between 30 and 40 per cent of total debt overhang 
and the 50 most indebted companies holding between 50 and 60 per cent of total 
corporate excessive debt. 
 On average, the largest 100 financially distressed firms in six CESEE countries account 
for 8 per cent of total value added and 6 per cent of total employment, while the 300 
most indebted firms account for 13 and 16 per cent of overall employment and value 
added, respectively. To put it differently, 1 in 8 employees and 1 in 6 euros created in the 
corporate sector are directly affected by the 300 most indebted companies. 
 Estimations of our debt spillovers model show that firms’ own financial distress was 
largely tolerated before the crisis, that is, it had no significant impact on firm 
performance, but became severely taxing on firm performance in the post-crisis period 
when banks tightened credit standards. 
 In addition to this direct effect, firms’ performance is significantly affected by the 
excessive debt of firms in other horizontally or vertically linked industries. There are 
substantial negative spillovers from overleveraged companies in the same industry as 
well as vertical debt spillover effects of the most indebted companies in vertically linked 
firms. 
 Firms’ performance is more severely affected by the poor financial health of suppliers, 
rather than customers. Most importantly, these effects are aggravated during the financial 
crisis and are more severe for small and medium-sized firms. 
 Simulations based on our estimated model show that if debt in the largest 100 debtors of 
our sample was reduced to acceptable levels in line with the investment grade rating, we 
would expect an additional indirect boost to sales of vertically linked firms by between 
0.5 per cent (Croatia), 1 per cent (Bulgaria, Hungary and Serbia) and 2.5 per cent 
(Romania). Similarly, deleveraging the 100 most indebted firms would indirectly boost 
employment levels in other firms by 0.25 to 3 per cent, and investment by up to 1 per 
cent. 
These results enable us to draw important policy implications regarding the need to design 
policies that support the repair of private companies’ balance sheets. Institutional reforms 
focusing on debt resolution frameworks specifically targeting “systemically important” 
larger debtor companies may provide essential support to faster economic recovery in some 
of the debt-ridden CESEE countries. Our findings suggest that SMEs will also indirectly 
benefit by a timely resolution of NPLs of the most extremely leveraged companies. 
The outline of the paper is as follows. The next section describes the microdata used. Section 
3 assesses the extent of corporate leverage of companies in CESEE countries. Section 4 
introduces the empirical models estimated, while section 5 presents the main results from 
various specifications of the model. In section 6 we provide some simulated effects of 
deleveraging the most indebted firms on individual firm performance in terms of sales, 
employment and investment. The last section concludes. 
 
  
2. Data 
The data used for this analysis come from different sources. Where possible, national 
sources of data on the total firm population in a country were used. Unfortunately, this was 
possible only for Croatia and Hungary, where local researchers were engaged to work with 
the provided statistical code on empirical estimations with confidential national micro data.
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For Croatia, the data come from Financial Agency (FINA), which collects annual balance 
sheets and income statements for all firms liable by law. The data cover all companies, with 
no cut-off in terms of firm size, and covers the period 2002-14.  
Hungarian firm-level data used for this study comprise a combination of balance sheet and 
income statements. The data come from NAV, the Hungarian tax authority, and are made 
available to the Databank of the research institute CERS-HAS. The data set has universal 
coverage of companies excluding self-employed and some partnerships across all sectors of 
the economy. There is no firm size cut-off. The data for this analysis cover the 2005-13 
period. 
Microdata on firms from Bulgaria, Montenegro, Romania and Serbia come from the 
Amadeus database. We employ annual financial and accounting data for the period between 
2005 and 2014. Amadeus (Bureau van Dijk) includes standardised annual accounts 
(consolidated and unconsolidated), financial ratios, sectoral activities and ownership data. 
Additionally, we include supplemental information on ownership indicators (immediate 
ownership and ultimate ownership data) from the Orbis (Bureau van Dijk) database to 
improve the overall sample size.  
In principle, the full Amadeus database includes information on all firms, but with some 
exclusion criteria. Banks and insurance entities are excluded, as are firms with no financial 
data available (assets, debt, etc). Amadeus also does not gather data on firms that have been 
inactive for more than two years or firms whose last available data are older than six years. 
Crucially, branches are also not included in the sample. Sole traders/proprietorships that 
have consolidation code LF (limited financial), NRF (no recent financial) or NRLF (no 
recent limited financial) and with fewer than two employees (1, 0 or n.a.) and entities that 
are not obliged to report financial information are also excluded from the database.  
For all six countries in our study we performed standard data cleaning, which means that 
observations with negative or non-existent assets, negative value added, no sales and no 
employment were eliminated. Depending on the country, this reduced the sample size up to 
17 per cent relative to the original data. Naturally, due to missing variables, the actual 
samples that were used in econometric analysis are considerably smaller.  
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 Relevant national authorities, such as statistical offices, tax authorities and/or central banks were contacted 
also in Albania, Montenegro and Serbia. However, the authorities' replies were that either there were no 
complete microdata available with the necessary financial information (Albania, Montenegro) or the data were 
confidential or could be purchased for an extremely high fee only (Serbia). 
Table 1: Data sample after cleaning, breakdown by size classes, 2014 (2013 for Hungary) 
 
Number of companies 
 
HR HU BG RO RS ME 
Micro (0-9) 93,003 370,824 663,617 710,519 80,761 2,049 
Small (10-49) 1,243 23,071 40,953 45,966 10,623 472 
Medium (50-499) 223 4,868 9,056 9,418 2,747 209 
Large (500+) 23 384 375 468 148 9 
Total 94,492 399,147 714,001 766,371 94,279 2,739 
 
Distribution by size classes (in %) 
 
HR HU BG RO RS ME 
Micro (0-9) 98.5 92.9 92.9 92.7 85.7 74.8 
Small (10-49) 1.3 5.8 5.7 6.0 11.3 17.2 
Medium (50-499) 0.2 1.2 1.3 1.2 2.9 7.6 
Large (500+) 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Notes: HR – Croatia, HU – Hungary, BG – Bulgaria, RO – Romania, RS – Republic of Serbia, ME – 
Montenegro. 
Sources: FINA, MAV and Amadeus. 
 
Nevertheless, after data cleaning we end up with reasonably large data sets for all countries, 
except Montenegro (see Table 1). For Croatia and Serbia the latest annual data set (for 2014) 
comprises nearly 100,000 firms, in Hungary there were 400,000 firms included (latest year is 
2013), while in Bulgaria and Romania data were available for more than 700,000 companies 
for the latest year. It is only in Montenegro that the company sample with available data is 
very low (2,700 companies in 2014).  
Breakdown of data samples by size classes reveals a strong composition bias towards micro 
and small firms. Disregarding Montenegro, between 85 and 98 per cent of all firms in the 
sample are micro firms with fewer than 10 employees. Another 1 to 11 per cent of all firms 
are small firms with between 10 and 50 employees. Only about 0.2 to 3 per cent of all firms 
in the samples can be classified as either medium-sized (with between 50 and 500 
employees) or large (more than 500 employees). 
Sample representativeness is traditionally an important concern with firm-level data. Ideally 
the sample is representative of the population of firms with respect to its most important 
characteristics, such as the size and industry distribution. Table 2 presents the basic 
representativeness of our data sample for six countries with respect to firm size. For these 
purposes we use Eurostat Structural Business Statistics for EU member states (Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Hungary and Romania) and data from the national statistical offices and national 
central banks of Montenegro and Serbia.
3
  
Table 2: Representativeness of the sample data with regard to the total population of 
companies, by size classes, 2013* (in %) 
 
 
HR HU BG RO RS ME 
Micro (0-9) 69.3 78.7 100.0 79.6 42.6 n.a. 
Small (10-49) 12.2 95.8 86.9 99.2 87.8 12.1 
Medium (50-249) 12.5 n.a. 97.2 89.3 90.9 90.9 
Large (250+) 5.7 n.a. 96.2 60.9 82.6 21.4 
Total 64.4 79.9 99.2 81.7 48.5 13.0 
 
Notes: The table presents respective fractions of firms in our data sample relative to the total firm 
population. The data published by the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia was in RS dinars 
and was converted into euros using the official exchange rate of the National Bank of Serbia for 31 
December 2013. The last year of available data from Monstat is 2011. Data for Montenegro are 
available in euros, so no conversion was required.* 2011 for Montenegro. Country abbreviations are 
defined in Table 1. 
Sources: Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia, National Bank of Serbia, Monstat (the statistical 
office of Montenegro; Amadeus and Eurostat Structural Business Statistics for other countries. 
 
Table 2 shows that our data sample is highly representative of all firms across all size classes 
with overall coverage ranging between 64 and 99 per cent. The only exceptions are 
Montenegro (in all size classes except medium-sized firms), Croatia (in all size classes 
except micro firms) and to some extent Serbia (for micro firms only).
4
 
Given the above sample characteristics, special attention has to be paid when the estimates 
are interpreted. Generally, the sample is dominated by micro and small firms (see Table 1), 
but less so than all firms in respective countries.  
Additional data cleaning was done prior to the econometric analyses. Outliers in terms of the 
1st and 100th percentile of growth rates of assets, employment, labour productivity and total 
factor productivity were dropped. 
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 Due to confidentiality in Eurostat SBS there are no data for medium and large firms in Hungary. There are 
also differences in definitions of company size classes between Eurostat and national statistics as well as with 
regard to the definition used in this study, which required some adjusting in Table 2. Eurostat splits the sample 
of small firms (10-49 employees) into two subsamples (10-19, 20-49), while large firms are defined as those 
with 250 employees or more (500 employees elsewere). 
4
 As we use the total number of firms for Croatia, this apparent low coverage in some of the size classes might 
be the effect of data cleaning, where companies with negative or missing values have been excluded from the 
sample. 
3. Extent of corporate leverage in CESEE countries  
In this section, we provide an assessment of overall corporate leverage of companies in 
CESEE countries. Section 3.1 shows the overall magnitude of debt and NPLs, while section 
3.2 presents the distribution of corporate net debt and debt overhang and an overall 
assessment of the direct macroeconomic importance of financial distress in the corporate 
sector. 
 
3.1. Overall extent of NPL and debt leverage 
As noted in IMF (2015), despite high deleveraging efforts by the private sector – as 
measured by the adjustment in the private sector net saving-investment balances – CESEE 
countries have been unable to reduce their elevated private debt. Furthermore, in most of the 
countries the private debt burden relative to GDP has increased since 2008 and remains very 
high. Similarly, the extent of NPLs in most of the countries worsened between 2010 and 
2014 (Chart 1). 
Chart 1: Ratio of NPLs to total bank loans in CESEE countries, 2010 and 2014 (%) 
 
Source: World DataBank, World Development Indicators, 2016. 
 
Chart 2, presenting a breakdown of NPL by type of borrower, indicates that a major source 
of NPLs in CESEE countries are overdue loans in the corporate sector. The only exception is 
in Hungary where most NPLs consist of household mortgage loans that used to be 
denominated in Swiss francs. 
In most of the countries the extent of NPLs is further worsening, along with extensive 
discussions on possible NPL resolution forms. Up to 2014, the extent of NPLs slightly 
decreased in Hungary and Albania, mostly due to debt restructuring schemes, while more 
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effective steps have been taken only in Romania. Romania in 2014 enacted procedures for 
accelerated NPL disposals and write-offs of corporate NPLs leading to substantial reduction 
in the NPL ratio from 21.7 per cent in 2013 to 13.9 per cent in 2014.  
 
Chart 2: Breakdown of NPL by borrower type in CESEE countries, 2012-14 (in € million) 
 
Notes: Total NPL ratio (right scale). Total NPL volumes only are available for Albania and 
Montenegro. For Romania, only total NPL volumes were published in 2014 due to accelerated NPL 
disposals and write-offs. 
Sources: Deloitte, 2014 and 2015, based on national bank data, Central Bank of Montenegro and 
World DataBank, World Development Indicators, 2016. 
 
As shown in Chart 3, corporate sectors in most CESEE countries embarked on a prolonged 
path of debt deleveraging with total loans to corporate sector further decreasing or, at best, 
stagnating (Montenegro). Reducing the credit exposure of the corporate sector to banks, 
however, did not result in a significant reduction of NPLs. On the contrary, NPL ratios are 
further decreasing (with the exception of Albania, Hungary and Romania). This indicates 
that, first, debt deleveraging in these countries has mostly taken the form of net saving – that 
is, investment balances were improved by excess saving, but much less through debt 
restructuring and write-offs; and second, that the slow recovery in aggregate demand is 
holding back private sector balance sheet improvements and worsening the prospects of debt 
sustainability, as the most indebted companies cannot grow out of debt. This in turn 
contributes to further deterioration of bank balance sheets and a widening of the gap between 
credit demand and supply.  
  
0.0% 
5.0% 
10.0% 
15.0% 
20.0% 
25.0% 
0 
2,000 
4,000 
6,000 
8,000 
10,000 
12,000 
2
0
1
2
 
2
0
1
3
 
2
0
1
4
 
2
0
1
2
 
2
0
1
3
 
2
0
1
4
 
2
0
1
2
 
2
0
1
3
 
2
0
1
4
 
2
0
1
2
 
2
0
1
3
 
2
0
1
4
 
2
0
1
2
 
2
0
1
3
 
2
0
1
4
 
2
0
1
2
 
2
0
1
3
 
2
0
1
4
 
2
0
1
2
 
2
0
1
3
 
2
0
1
4
 
Bulgaria Croatia Hungary Romania Serbia Albania Montenegro 
Corporate NPL (EUR mn) Retail NPL (EUR mn) Total NPL (EUR mn) NPL ratio (%) right scale 
Chart 3: Total loans and NPL ratios for corporate sector, 2012-14 (€ million) 
 
Note: Total NPL ratio only available for Montenegro. For Romania, total NPL ratio for 2014. 
Sources: As per Chart 2. 
 
In subsequent analysis we switch to company-level data and focus on corporate debt 
leverage and distribution of excessive debt across the corporate sector. As is standard in the 
financial literature, we use net debt as a measure of corporate indebtedness, which is defined 
as total long-term and short-term debt minus cash and cash equivalents. 
The overall debt leverage ratio is calculated using the debt-to-EBITDA ratio, which is a 
common metric used to evaluate companies’ ability to pay off incurred debt. The debt-to-
EBITDA leverage ratio is calculated as a company’s total outstanding net debt relative to its 
earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortisation (EBITDA). In financial 
analysis, a leverage ratio in the range of 3 to 4 is taken as an upper bound of still sustainable 
debt. A ratio higher than 4 or 5 typically indicates that a company is less able to handle its 
debt burden, which in turn limits its ability to take on the additional debt.
5
 There are other 
metrics possible to assess unsustainable corporate debt levels, such as using different ratings 
criteria. For instance, one could apply the debt-to-EBITDA ratios that are used by Moody’s 
for corporate ratings Ba and B for individual industries.
6
 The Ba rating is associated with an 
aggregate debt-to-EBITDA ratio amounting to 3.3 (whereby these ratios differ widely across 
different industries), while a B rating is associated with the aggregate ratio of close to 5 
(again, different across industries). We also applied these leverage cut-off criteria for 
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 These “tolerated” leverage ratios may vary substantially across industries depending on industry-specific 
capital intensity and liquidity. For instance, in retail and distribution the typical ratios tolerated by banks are 
higher than on average, while in the highly capital-intensive pharmaceutical industry the ratio tolerated is lower 
than the aggregate economy average ratio. 
6 See Moody’s Financial Metrics Key Ratios by Rating and Industry for Non-Financial Corporations: Europe, 
Middle East and Africa, December 2012. 
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Romania Bulgaria Hungary Croatia Serbia Montenegro 
unsustainable debt, but while the overall level of excessive debt differs across different 
leverage cut-offs by some +/- 10 per cent, the variation and distribution of debt overhang do 
not differ substantially. 
We calculate unsustainable debt (subsequently referred to also as debt overhang or excessive 
debt) as: 
Debt overhang = Total net debt – 4 * EBITDA,   (1) 
We are aware of the fact that excess debt calculated as net debt - 4*EBITDA might not be 
the proper measure of the true excess debt, as for some some companies the sustainable level 
of debt can be either higher or lower. The usual approach taken in corporate finance 
literature to assess the debt overhang is to calculate the sustainable level of debt and then 
take the difference between the current level of debt and the sustainable level of debt as a 
measure of true excess debt. 
In the literature there are several methods to assess the debt sustainability of firms and the 
corresponding excess debt (see Bruggeman, 2013, for a discussion of methods and 
indicators). Most comprehensive methods that take into account the debt servicing capacity 
of companies include in particular: (i) the stationarity approach (Cuerpo et al., 2014); (ii) the 
contingent claims analysis method (Gapen et al., 2004); and (iii) the net free cash flow 
(NFCF) method (IMF, 2013).  
The stationarity approach is based on the idea that a debt is sustainable if it moves in line 
with total discounted assets. While the advantage of this method is that it does not require 
defining threshold values of debt, its disadvantage is that the assessment of the imbalance 
between sustainable and actual debt levels depends on the selection of a reference year for 
sustainable debt, which is made arbitrarily. The contingent claims analysis method is based 
on the assessment of corporate probability of default. This method requires data on the 
market value of listed companies, which is problematic for emerging markets with less 
developed capital markets and only a small number of listed companies.  
The NFCF method is based on the calculation of net free cash flow on firm-level data, which 
shows if a firm is able to finance liabilities to creditors and owners from current operations. 
A positive value of NFCF indicates that corporate debt is sustainable – that is, that a firm can 
finance debt from its current operations. In contrast, if NFCF is negative, the enterprise is 
unable to generate sufficient cash flow to finance its existing debt level (while retaining the 
existing level of capital investment and dividend payments), so the company is over-
indebted. This method requires projection of NFCF in the medium term, whereby operating 
cash flow before interest and interest expense are projected, while the other components of 
NFCF (capital expenditures and dividends) are kept constant. Firms with the debt-to-assets 
ratio above 30 per cent and a negative projected value of net free cash flow in the medium 
term are considered over-indebted. For the over-indebted companies, the sustainable debt 
level is derived as the debt level at which medium-term NFCF equals zero. The difference 
between the existing debt level and the sustainable debt level of over-indebted enterprises is 
then taken as debt overhang. 
While the above-mentioned methods are attractive from the academic point of view, they are 
associated with a number of assumptions and/or arbitrarily chosen thresholds and reference 
years. Instead, we decided to use a simpler metric (net debt – EBITDA) > 4) that is usually 
taken in the financial industry as a simple rule of thumb of debt sustainability.  
Based on this criterion, we aggregate the total debt overhang across all companies in an 
individual CESEE economy. Note that when aggregating the net debt of companies, for 
obvious reasons we exclude firms with either zero debt or negative net debt. In addition, in 
all charts presented below we exclude companies in the financial sector (that is, Nace Rev. 2 
2-digit codes 64, 65 and 66). 
 
Chart 4: Distribution of net debt and debt overhang across the leverage ratios, Croatia, 2014  
 
Notes: Firms with positive net debt and non-zero debt only. Figures do not include companies in the 
financial sector. Leverage ratio is defined as net debt/EBITDA ratio. Debt overhang is defined as (net 
debt – EBITDA) > 4. 
Sources: FINA; own calculations. 
 
As an example of overall corporate debt distribution, Chart 4 shows the distribution of net 
debt and debt overhang across classes of leverage ratios in Croatia for the last year of the 
sample (2014). Based on the above criteria, in 2014, one-third of firms (with non-zero debt 
and positive net debt) held about 80 per cent of total outstanding net debt.
7
 Furthermore, 17 
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 Note that Martinis and Ljubaj (2016) find that using the NFCF debt sustainability analysis approximately one-
third (31.2 per cent) of the corporate debt in Croatia is excessive. They find that about 7 per cent of all firms in 
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per cent of firms were classified as extremely leveraged with a leverage ratio exceeding 10. 
Those companies accounted for more than 40 per cent of overall corporate net debt and for 
almost two-thirds of overall corporate excessive debt.  
 
Chart 5: Distribution of debt overhang across the leverage ratio, 2014 
 
Notes: Firms with positive net debt and non-zero debt only. Figures do not include companies in the 
financial sector. Leverage ratio is defined as net debt/EBITDA ratio. Debt overhang is defined as (net 
debt – EBITDA) > 4. 
Sources: Amadeus, FINA, MAV; own calculations. 
 
A similar picture can be observed (in Chart 5) in five other CESEE countries with 70 per 
cent of all excessive debt falling into the category of extreme leverage (exceeding leverage 
ratio of 10). Moreover, as shown in Table 3, on average 30 per cent of indebted firms 
account for 70 per cent of overall corporate net debt. There is some variation across 
countries, with most notably Hungary on the upper extreme and Serbia on the lower bound 
of debt concentration. 
  
                                                                                                                                                                           
their sample can be characterised as excessively leveraged (they, however, use the Amadeus data with a sample 
which is three times smaller than our total number of Croatian firms). 
1.8%	
11.6%	
16.1%	
70.3%	
0	-	4	 4	-	5	 5	-	7	 7	-	10	 >	10	
0.0%	
10.0%	
20.0%	
30.0%	
40.0%	
50.0%	
60.0%	
70.0%	
80.0%	
net	debt/EBITDA	ra o	
D
e
b
t	o
ve
rh
an
g	(%
	in
	to
tal)	
Croa a	 Bulgaria	 Hungary	 Romania	 Serbia	 Montenegro	 Average	
Table 3: Share of overleveraged companies with corresponding share of overall net debt and 
debt overhang, 2014  
 
  Firms with excess leverage* 
Firms with extreme 
leverage** 
  
% of total 
#firms 
% of net debt 
% of total 
#firms 
% of debt 
overhang 
Bulgaria 24.0 65.9 9.3 72.9 
Croatia 32.6 80.3 16.9 64.3 
Hungary 10.9 80.8 4.8 75.8 
Montenegro 31.0 47.6 9.0 67.8 
Romania 34.4 71.5 12.3 71.4 
Serbia 41.8 69.2 17.6 69.7 
Average*** 29.1 69.2 11.7 70.3 
Notes: Debt overhang defined as (net debt – EBITDA) > 4. Firms with positive net debt and non-zero 
debt only. Figures do not include companies in the financial sector.* Firms with net debt-to-EBITDA 
ratio > 4; ** Firms with net debt-to-EBITDA ratio > 10; *** Simple average. 
Sources: Amadeus, FINA, MAV; own calculations. 
 
3.2. Concentration of debt overhang and macroeconomic implications 
Evidence from section 3.1 indicates that corporate net debt and debt overhang are highly 
concentrated across CESEE economies. This is indeed confirmed when ranking companies 
according to their net debt or excessive debt and identifying a country’s largest individual 
debtors. On average across countries, the 20 largest debtor companies account for almost 30 
per cent of total debt overhang, while the top 100 and top 300 companies account for almost 
one half and two-thirds of overall excessive debt, respectively (Chart 7). There is some 
variation across countries with Bulgaria, Hungary and Serbia showing the largest 
concentration of excessive debt. In these three countries, the top 10 largest debtor companies 
hold between 30 and 40 per cent of total debt overhang (see Chart 6).
8
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 In a similar analysis, but using the NFCF debt sustainability analysis, Martinis and Ljubaj (2016) also find 
that debt overhang in the Croatian corporate sector is concentrated in a small number of enterprises. They find 
that the top 10 firms with the highest debt overhang (in absolute amounts) hold more than one-third of total 
debt overhang, while the top 100 enterprises with the highest debt overhang hold as much as three-quarters of 
the entire debt overhang of the sample. Our total population of firm data shows, however, a smaller 
concentration of debt for Croatia, with the top 10 and top 100 firms with the highest debt overhang holding 14 
and 36 per cent of total debt overhang. These differences, again, can be attributed to the differences in sample 
and possible sample selection issues, whereby our sample consists of total population of firms and is three 
times larger than the Amadeus sample used by Martinis and Ljubaj (2016). 
Chart 6: Concentration of debt overhang in corporate sector of CESEE countries (based on 
debt-to-EBITDA ratio)  
  
  
  
Note: Firms with positive net debt only. Figures do not include companies in the financial sector 
(Nace Rev. 2 2-digit codes 64, 65 and 66). 
Sources: Amadeus, FINA, MAV; own calculations. 
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Hungary,	2013	
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Chart 7: Concentration of debt overhang in the top 300 most indebted companies in CESEE 
countries, 2014 (per cent) 
 
Notes: Firms with positive net debt only. Figures do not include companies in the financial sector. 
Sources: Amadeus; FINA, MAV; own calculations. 
 
The large concentration of debt and debt overhang in the top 300 companies, as presented in 
Charts 6 and 7, is not a standard feature of economic structure in individual countries. While 
in terms of total sales and employment the CESEE countries follow the standard “20-80 
rule” as found in the literature9 (with 20 per cent of largest companies contributing 80 per 
cent to total output and a bit less to employment), Chart 8 demonstrates that in terms of debt 
overhang they follow roughly a “10-90 rule”. In other words, 10 per cent of the largest 
debtor companies account for 90 to 95 per cent of total debt overhang. The exception is 
Romania where debt concentration is a bit lower (10 per cent of the largest debtors account 
for 80 per cent of total debt overhang). 
Debt concentration is not an issue specific to CESEE countries only but may be 
characteristic for emerging countries. There is scant evidence on debt concentration for 
developed economies. Similar results for concentration of debt overhang were found for 
Slovenia (Damijan, 2014). For Chinese firms, Chivakul and Lam (2015) show that there is 
substantial concentration of debt as the top 200 most indebted firms held almost three-
quarters of all liabilities of non-financial firms in China in 2013 and the top 10 non-financial 
listed firms account for over 20 per cent of total corporate liabilities among non-financial 
listed firms, mostly from real estate and construction, and mining and utilities. Echoing these 
findings, the IMF (2015) finds that the top 10 per cent of indebted firms have increased their 
leverage ratios from 230 to 350 per cent between 2003 and 2013, while the leverage ratio of 
the median firm decreased from 108 to 50 per cent in the same period. Along those lines, in 
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 See Mayer and Ottaviano (2008). 
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the period between 2003 and 2013 in the emerging markets the share of firms with interest 
coverage ratio below 1 increased from 11 to 22 per cent. This indicates the surge in debt 
concentration in a smaller number of increasingly leveraged firms. 
Chart 8: Cumulative distribution of sales, employment and debt overhang in CESEE countries 
 
  
  
 
Notes: Figures show Lorenz cumulative distribution of companies according to their shares in total 
sales, employment and debt overhang. Firms with positive net debt only. Figures do not include 
companies in the financial sector. The chart for Montenegro was omitted due to a very small sample 
of companies. 
Sources: Amadeus; FINA, MAV; own calculations. 
 
This indicates that concentration of debt is a critical feature in the CESEE economies, which 
can present a significant drag on economic growth. In a recent paper, Balgova and 
Plekhanov (2016) find that, in general, when countries ignore the NPL problem the foregone 
growth due to the overhang of NPLs can amount to 1.5 percentage points annually, until the 
problem is resolved. One of the channels through which a large debt overhang impacts 
growth is directly through the performance of the indebted companies. In addition to 
restricted access to loans for investments in capacity expansions, overleveraged firms are 
also limited in their day-to-day business as they cannot borrow even for acquiring working 
capital or paying the wages to employees. The bigger the fraction of output and employment 
accounted for by overleveraged firms, the bigger will be the drag on overall economic 
growth.
10
 
Chart 9 shows the macroeconomic importance of the top 300 financially distressed 
companies in Croatia and Hungary, for which we have data for all firms. Although the debt 
overhang is highly concentrated in the top 50 and top 300 largest debtor companies (where 
the latter account for 50 to 70 per cent of total excess debt), the direct importance of these 
companies in terms of overall sales, employment and exports is relatively modest. In Croatia, 
the top 300 debtor firms with 50 per cent of total debt overhang account for about 15 per 
cent of total value added and exports, while in Hungary they account for even less than 10 
per cent. 
Chart 9: Macroeconomic importance of top 300 financially distressed companies in Croatia 
and Hungary (per cent) 
  
Sources: FINA, MAV; own calculations. 
 
The direct macroeconomic impact of large overleveraged companies, however, as presented 
in Chart 10, is bigger in Montenegro, Serbia and to some extent also in Bulgaria. On 
average, the top 100 financially distressed firms in six CESEE countries account for 8 per 
cent of total value added and 6 per cent of total employment, while the top 300 debtors 
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 Note that with falling bond interest rates worldwide there is a trend of rebalancing from bank loans towards 
bonds because bank credit becomes relatively more expensive, reflecting the scarcity of bank equity. Chang et 
al (2016) develop a dynamic open economy model where these modes of finance are determined endogenously 
and which enables them to study interactions between modes of finance and macroeconomic fluctuations. 
While this mode of finance became more significant in the post-crisis period in some European countries, it is 
however still confined to countries with more developed capital markets (such as Germany, Italy and the 
Netherlands), but remains quite volatile and low compared with bank financing (see Kaya et al, 2013). For 
CESEE countries, which are characterised by underdeveloped capital markets, bond financing is still perceived 
as highly sophisticated and usually employed by the largest firms only. 
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account for 13 and 16 per cent of overall employment and value added, respectively.
11
 To 
put it differently, 1 in 8 of all employees and 1 in 6 euros created in the corporate sector are 
directly affected by the top 300 most indebted companies. This suggests that governments in 
CESEE countries cannot continue to ignore the problem of NPLs, but rather have to 
undertake some form of NPL resolution to release the brake on economic growth. 
 
Chart 10: Macroeconomic importance of top 300 financially distressed companies in CESEE 
countries, 2014 (per cent) 
 
Sources: Amadeus, FINA, MAV; own calculations. Country abbreviations are defined in Table 1. 
 
 
However, as mentioned above, the direct macroeconomic importance of the most heavily 
indebted companies understates their true impact on the economy. There is namely also a 
secondary channel at work here, as large financially distressed firms can exert important 
network effects. Large overleveraged companies are likely to be important suppliers and/or 
buyers, which means that they can affect performance of their partners due to their inability 
to either (i) provide services or products to their upstream buyers, or (ii) sustain demand 
and/or to meet financial obligations to their downstream suppliers.  
The size of these network effects depends on the individual size of financially distressed 
companies and the intensity of the input-output linkages with other vertically linked 
companies. The next chapter discusses the relevance of network effects compared with direct 
effects, while in section 5 we empirically account for their importance. 
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 Data on exports are available only for Croatia and Hungary, while in Amadeus there is very poor coverage of 
export figures. 
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4. Empirical debt spillovers model 
We argue that due to potential network effects, the existence of financially distressed large 
firms may play a similar role in the propagation of the crisis as systemic banks are burdened 
by the large shares of NPLs in their portfolios. It is essential to study the network effects of 
such “systemically important” companies in the economy and to what extent their financial 
health/distress affects the rest of the economy.  
In the subsequent analysis we aim to study whether huge debt concentration by individual 
large debtor companies affects growth not only directly through lower firm activity, but may 
potentially have a depressing effect on the economy also through negative debt spillover 
effects on vertically linked firms. We study the importance of the direct and indirect effects 
of excessive debt of the largest debtor companies, in particular the backward and forward 
debt spillovers to other sectors and firms.  
To study the impact of large debtor companies on their own and on the performance of other 
firms, the largest debtor firms were divided into two groups – the top 100 and top 300 largest 
debtor firms. Based on this, their combined impact on the performance of companies in the 
same industry and on companies that are vertically linked through input-output linkages, are 
estimated.  
We estimate the following debt spillover empirical model: 
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where Δyit is a growth rate of total factor productivity, labour productivity, employment and 
investment, depending on the choice of left-hand side variable. C is a vector of firm-specific 
controls, such as number of employees and capital intensity, labour productivity and export 
status. The set of control variables differs depending on what performance measures are used 
as regressants. In the first two specifications we will explore changes in total factor 
productivity
12
 and labour productivity as dependent variables Δyit) and use lagged firm size 
(employment) and capital intensity (ratio of capital to employment) as control variables. In 
                                                        
12  Total factor productivity (TFP) is estimated using the approach outlined in Wooldridge (2009). The Wooldridge 
estimation algorithm addresses the key shortcomings of the two most commonly used methods of estimating total factor 
productivity (TFP); the Olley-Pakes (OP, 1996) and Levinsohn-Petrin (LP, 2003) methods. As pointed out in Ackerberg, 
Caves and Fraser (2006), the LP approach potentially suffers from an identification problem in the first estimation stage. 
Namely, if the labour is optimally determined by the firm, it is also a function of unobserved productivity and state 
variables and is therefore non-parametrically unidentified. The OP approach, on the other hand, rests only on the subset of 
firms with positive investments, while relying heavily on proper measurement of the capital variable. Taking on Ackerberg 
et al. (2006), Wooldridge proposes using a single set of moments, while information on error covariances can be used to 
address their inefficiencies. 
the case of employment and investment growth we additionally include lagged labour 
productivity as one of the regressors. 
The next four variables account for firm i's profitability and financial health. ROEit-1 is a firm 
i’s return on equity at time t-1; ICRit-1 is firm i’s interest coverage ratio at time t-1; DEit-1 
denotes firm i’s debt-to-EBITDA ratio; and liquidityt-1 is the corresponding current ratio 
(that is, short-term assets to short-term liabilities ratio).  
The next five variables account for ownership and input-output linkages interacted with the 
specific debtor group extent of excess debt. Expit is an exporter dummy variable indicating 
whether firm i is exporting in period t. Dt
jk
 denotes debtor group k’s (top 100 and top 300) 
share in overall net debt. HLt
jk
, BLt
jk
 and FLt
jk
 stand for horizontal intra-industry linkages, 
backward (upstream) linkages and forward (downstream) linkages of debtor group k’s for 
firms located in industry j, respectively. All variables are interacted with debtor group k’s 
share in overall net debt (Dt
jk
). In addition, we also include a crisis dummy variable (Cr) that 
assumes 0 for the period 2005-08 and 1 for the period 2009-14. 
Finally, timet and indj are year and industry j fixed effects, respectively. The term ηi  denotes 
firm i fixed effects, while εit is an identically and independently distributed error term. Year 
fixed effects are included only in specifications without the crisis dummy variable and 
corresponding interaction terms with other variables in the model. 
In addition to firm i-s indicators of financial health, key variables of interest are related to 
the impact of specific input-output linkages to which an individual firm is exposed. These 
linkages effects are the standard approach to study, for example, the impact of spillovers of 
foreign-owned companies on performance of local firms
13
 or to account for the knowledge 
spillovers from innovative firms to other firms in the economy.
14
 
Chart 11: Representation of the debt spillover model
 
Source: Author’s own graphics. 
                                                        
13 See Blalock (2001), Schoors and van der Tool (2001), Smarzynska (2002, 2004), Damijan et al. (2003), Kugler (2006), 
Halpern and Murakozy (2007), Gorodnichenko et al. (2007), and Damijan et al. (2013). 
14 See for example Damijan and Stare (2015). 
 The mechanism of spillovers in the model is depicted in Chart 11, showing how a firm’s 
performance is affected by its own financial distress and three types of debt spillovers. 
Horizontal debt spillovers arise from the most heavily indebted firms in the same industry, 
while backward and forward debt spillovers arise due to financial distress of the largest 
debtors in supplying (backward linkage) and buying industries (forward linkage). 
HL
t
jk
 in model (2) stands for intra-industry spillovers, also called horizontal spillovers, that 
stem from specific debtor group. These spillovers can be seen either as competition effects 
within the same industry or as agglomeration effects within the same industry arising from 
the specific debtor group. Accordingly, we define horizontal spillovers as the share of an 
industry j's output produced by debtor group k: 
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In the next step we account for potential vertical spillovers of highly indebted firms on their 
upstream customers. We account for these backward linkages BLt
jk
 as the sum of the output 
of industries r purchased by firms in industry j weighted by the share of industry j's output 
produced by debtor group k (HLt
jk
): 
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where αjrt (0 ≤ αjrt ≤1) is the proportion of industry r’s output consumed by industry j. These 
direct input requirements are obtained from the input-output tables for a particular country. 
As the formula suggests, the greater the output share of debtor firms in sectors supplied by 
industry j and the larger the share of intermediates supplied to industries characterised by a 
higher degree of excess leverage, the higher the value of the variable. 
Finally, we also account for forward linkages, whereby FLt
jk
 is defined as the weighted share 
of output in upstream (or supplying) sectors produced by firms with excess leverage: 
FL
t
jk = s
jmt
*HL
t
jk( )m¹ j
n
å
,  m,j=1,...,n,  k=1,…,m  (5) 
 
where σjmt (0≤σjmt≤1) is the proportion of industry j’s output consumed by industry m, 
obtained from the input-output tables for a particular country. 
 
We estimate the effect of financial distress in interaction with network effects using 
company level data for the sample of countries for which quality firm-level data could be 
obtained (that is, Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Romania and Serbia).
15
 For Croatia and 
Hungary we were able to use data on total population of firms through our links with local 
researchers who collaborated in estimating the models according to the provided Stata code. 
For the other three countries the primary data source is the Amadeus/Orbis database (Bureau 
van Dijk). See section 2 for a discussion of the data.  
To construct the spillover variables through horizontal and vertical linkages between 
industries we used countries’ input-output tables from OECD for 2011 (the latest available). 
These I-O tables are based on Nace Rev.1 and comprise 34 2-digit sectors).  I-O tables were 
matched to firm-level data using the firms’ primary Nace Rev.1 code. Note that companies 
in the financial sector were excluded from our analysis as well as vertical linkages to the 
financial sector. 
We have a panel structure of the data for 1995-2014 (up to 2013 for Hungary) and employ a 
fixed-effects (FE) estimator. All variables in model (2), apart from dummy variables, are 
specified in logs, which enables us to interpret obtained results as elasticities. As a 
robustness check to our FE estimator we also estimated models using the OLS estimator with 
dependent variables in first-differences and industry dummies. Results obtained, however, 
are compatible with the FE-based results.  
Another option is to estimate our model (2) using the General Method of Moments (GMM) 
estimator, which is a preferable approach when variables in the model are endogenously 
determined and when some variables are highly persistent (auto-correlated, with significant 
AR1 and AR2 processes). Usually in such an analysis a dynamic (system) version of GMM 
is applied, where lagged levels of and first differences of variables are used as instruments 
for each of the variables in the model. The drawback of the GMM approach, however, is that 
it is not very robust. Since the differenced variables are very weak instruments for variables 
in levels and vice versa, the results are not very robust and lead to switching signs of the 
coefficients once the lag structure is changed. We experimented with a number of GMM 
specifications and obtained, under certain combinations of time lags of dependent and right-
hand-side variables, results matching our FE and OLS-based results in terms of sign and 
significance of the coefficients. Another problem with GMM estimates, which is a general 
problem of the GMM approach and which prevented us from presenting the GMM results,  
is the magnitude of the coefficients obtained. The coefficients obtained were usually by 
factor 10 or 100 or even more off those from the FE and OLS-based estimates and hence not 
economically meaningful. Because of this downside of GMM we continue with FE and OLS 
results by knowingly accepting the implicit toll of biased estimates. 
Another issue to be addressed here is the appropriate initial level of debt and the 
corresponding level of debt overhang. One possibility is to fix the debt in the pre-crisis year 
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and then use the difference between the current year debt and this fixed pre-crisis level of 
debt. There are, however, two problems with this. First, debt level in the pre-crisis year could 
be too high, which is mostly the case as almost all of the firms accumulated debt before the 
crisis and started deleveraging soon after that. This means that by using this approach we 
would actually get negative levels of debt overhang in the post-crisis period as firms struggle 
to deleverage. Second, in our empirical estimations we use the fixed effects (FE) estimator, 
which uses a within transformation of data (in order to wipe out the individual fixed effects). 
By this de-meaning transformation each variable is transformed in the way that a firm’s 
average value (mean over the sample period) is subtracted from the current year’s value. 
This is, in our view, a more reliable approach since the mean value and not the maximum 
value (usually for 2008 or 2009) is subtracted from the current values to obtain the level of 
debt overhang in empirical estimations. 
 
  
5. Results 
This section presents results obtained by estimating model (2). There were five different 
dependent variables used in the model: labour productivity, total factor productivity using 
Olley-Pakes specification, employment, investment and exports (where available) and 
several model specifications. The first specification follows closely the specification of 
model (2), but includes interaction terms between a firm’s own debt overhang and other 
variables in the model. The second specification includes interaction terms of all variables 
with the crisis dummy, which enables us to analyse whether own debt overhang and 
excessive debt by the top 100 and top 300 debtors had differential impacts before and after 
the crisis. The third specification accounts for firm size and differentiates the effects for 
small companies (fewer than 50 employees), medium-sized companies (between 50 and 250 
employees) and large companies (more than 250 employees). As the results for all these 
specifications and for five countries are quite complex in size and readability, we will mostly 
present the results in terms of smaller excerpts from the tables and in a graphical form. Full 
tables with results are reported in the Appendix. 
Results for two types of productivity (labour productivity and total factor productivity) are 
interesting and in line with expectations, though when reporting the results we mostly focus 
on results for employment and investment, which are more relevant given the aims of this 
analysis. Exports at the firm level were available only for three countries (Croatia, Hungary 
and Serbia), so we only briefly present these results for Croatia.
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5.1.  Base results with reduced form model 
In this section we present base results of the reduced-form specification of model (2) that 
includes interaction terms between a firm’s own debt overhang and other variables in the 
model. To give a flavour of results, we first present some base results for Croatia and then 
continue with results for all of the countries in our sample. 
Table 4 presents results for total factor productivity (TFP) as the dependent variable. As 
expected, results show that during the crisis, firms’ TFP on average declined by some 6 per 
cent, while exporters fared better with a 10 per cent higher TFP growth. In addition, bigger 
firms, firms with a higher capital/labour ratio, higher return on assets and lower burden of 
debt servicing (in terms of interest rate coverage) performed better in terms of TFP growth. 
Liquidity ratio is negatively related to TFP growth indicating that firms with a better 
liquidity structure are more likely to expand in terms of TFP. 
Among the main variables of interest, as expected, the company’s debt overhang is shown to 
provide a significant negative impact on TFP growth. Increasing debt overhang by 10 per 
cent leads to a decrease of TFP by some 0.4 to 0.6 per cent. We show results for debt 
spillovers for three different aggregate debt levels – for the top 100 (columns 1 and 2), top 
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 All results not reported in the paper can be obtained upon request from the authors. 
300 (columns 3 and 4) and all debtor firms (columns 5 and 6). Excessive debt by the top 100, 
top 300 and all debtor firms in the same industry (horizontal spillovers) negatively impacts 
the firm’s TFP (negative debt horizontal spillovers). A 10 per cent increase in debt overhang 
of the top 100, top 300 and all debtor firms in the same industry lowers a typical firm’s TFP 
by 0.1, 0.4 and 0.8 per cent, respectively. This indicates that half of the negative horizontal 
debt spillovers on TFP is generated by the top 300 most indebted companies.  
Interestingly, the impact of these negative horizontal debt spillovers remains unaltered when 
controlling for a firm’s own financial distress. For the top 100 and top 300 debtor firms the 
interaction term for own financial distress is not significant. The interaction term becomes 
significant only for all debtor firms’ horizontal debt spillovers and has a positive sign, but is 
small in magnitude, which means that horizontal debt spillovers from all debtor firms are 
less negative when taking into consideration firms’ own financial distress. To put it 
differently, a firm’s TFP is negatively affected through spillover effects by financial distress 
of the largest debtor firms in the same industry, irrespective of its own financial health. 
  
Table 4: Results for TFP for Croatia (reduced form model) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Crisis dummy -0.063 -0.060 -0.058 -0.056 -0.057 -0.055 
 [-23.01]*** [-22.40]*** [-22.08]*** [-21.43]*** [-21.89]*** [-21.25]*** 
Exporter dummy 0.107 0.102 0.107 0.102 0.107 0.102 
 [23.28]*** [22.64]*** [23.25]*** [22.61]*** [23.17]*** [22.54]*** 
Size (Log empl.) (t-1) 0.291 0.290 0.292 0.291 0.293 0.292 
 [70.00]*** [71.06]*** [70.02]*** [71.05]*** [70.14]*** [71.16]*** 
Log K/L ratio (t-1) 0.177 0.174 0.178 0.175 0.180 0.176 
 [56.28]*** [56.52]*** [56.45]*** [56.67]*** [56.77]*** [56.98]*** 
Return on equity (t-1) 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.044 0.044 0.044 
 [15.48]*** [15.72]*** [15.46]*** [15.70]*** [15.27]*** [15.51]*** 
Interest rate coverage (t-1) 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.008 
 [14.95]*** [14.22]*** [14.97]*** [14.22]*** [15.47]*** [14.71]*** 
Liquidity ratio (t-1) -0.031 -0.027 -0.031 -0.027 -0.030 -0.026 
 [-9.07]*** [-7.89]*** [-9.03]*** [-7.86]*** [-8.79]*** [-7.63]*** 
Debt overhang -0.043 -0.058 -0.043 -0.058 -0.043 -0.058 
 [-141.74]*** [-140.32]*** [-141.66]*** [-140.29]*** [-141.32]*** [-139.96]*** 
Hor. spillover (Top-100) -0.001 -0.001     
 [-1.74]* [-2.12]**     
Overhang x Hor_Top100  0.001     
  [1.15]     
Backward spillover (Top-100) 0.253 0.256     
 [28.59]*** [29.33]***     
Overhang x Backward_Top100  -0.003     
  [-1.14]     
Forward spillover (Top-100) -0.247 -0.245     
 [-39.88]*** [-39.97]***     
Overhang x Forward_Top100  0.021     
  [7.54]***     
Hor. spillover (Top-300)   -0.004 -0.004   
   [-7.02]*** [-6.98]***   
Overhang x Hor_Top300    0.000   
    [0.51]   
Backward spillover (Top-300)   0.314 0.320   
   [26.46]*** [27.32]***   
Overhang x Backward_Top300    -0.002   
    [-0.58]   
Forward spillover (Top-300)   -0.295 -0.293   
   [-37.03]*** [-37.34]***   
Overhang x Forward_Top300    0.019   
    [7.30]***   
Hor. spillover (All)     -0.008 -0.008 
     [-16.39]*** [-16.21]*** 
Overhang x Hor_All      0.001 
      [2.87]*** 
Backward spillover (All)     0.464 0.476 
     [23.74]*** [24.69]*** 
Overhang x Backward_All      -0.008 
      [-1.86]* 
Forward spillover (All)     -0.392 -0.396 
     [-25.95]*** [-26.62]*** 
Overhang x Forward_All      0.014 
      [5.48]*** 
Constant 9.770 9.680 9.545 9.422 10.172 10.002 
 [91.08]*** [91.65]*** [77.82]*** [77.99]*** [70.31]*** [70.23]*** 
Observations 336,193 336,193 336,193 336,193 336,193 336,193 
R-squared 0.848 0.853 0.848 0.853 0.848 0.853 
Notes: Dependent variable:  log of total factor productivity (Olley-Pakes TFP). Fixed effects estimations. 
Standard errors clustered at industry level. Robust t-statistics in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Among vertical debt spillovers, backward spillovers (financial distress in buying industries) 
seem to exert a positive impact on firm TFP, while forward spillovers have a negative 
impact. The magnitude of the debt spillovers in both cases increases with the volume of debt 
overhang (that is, the impact doubles from the top 100 debtor firms to the largest debtor 
firms). 
These debt spillovers also have similar effects on other dependent variables (labour 
productivity, employment, investment and exports). As shown in Table 5, own financial 
distress, financial distress in the same industry and financial distress in receiving industries 
negatively impact firm performance in all specifications. These effects are biggest in terms 
of labour productivity and TFP, followed by investment and exports growth, while being 
lowest in terms of employment growth. 
 
Table 5: Results for Croatia (reduced form model) 
 TFP Va/emp Empl. Invest. Exports 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Crisis dummy -0.056 -0.054 -0.004 -0.018 -0.123 
 [-21.43]*** [-20.32]*** [-2.51]** [-7.79]*** [-9.59]*** 
Exporter dummy 0.102 0.079 0.062 0.065  
 [22.61]*** [17.19]*** [20.63]*** [17.17]***  
Size (Log empl.) (t-1) 0.291 0.062 0.594 0.648 0.641 
 [71.05]*** [14.98]*** [170.16]*** [140.80]*** [33.31]*** 
Log K/L ratio (t-1) 0.175 0.155 0.044 0.530 0.270 
 [56.67]*** [50.08]*** [25.38]*** [100.39]*** [19.03]*** 
Return on equity (t-1) 0.044 0.038 0.018 0.015 0.036 
 [15.70]*** [13.36]*** [11.44]*** [5.21]*** [2.35]** 
Interest rate coverage (t-1) 0.008 0.006 0.006 0.002 0.002 
 [14.22]*** [10.05]*** [16.47]*** [4.18]*** [0.61] 
Liquidity ratio (t-1) -0.027 -0.029 0.008 0.026 -0.021 
 [-7.86]*** [-8.52]*** [4.43]*** [9.33]*** [-1.55] 
Debt overhang -0.058 -0.056 -0.007 -0.019 -0.040 
 [-140.29]*** [-135.09]*** [-31.43]*** [-56.92]*** [-22.78]*** 
Hor. spillover (Top-300) -0.004 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 
 [-6.98]*** [-5.62]*** [-6.57]*** [-4.93]*** [-0.48] 
Overhang x Hor_Top300 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 
 [0.51] [0.49] [0.21] [-0.57] [-0.24] 
Backward spillover (Top-300) 0.320 0.292 0.059 0.199 0.151 
 [27.32]*** [24.45]*** [8.37]*** [19.42]*** [2.86]*** 
Overhang x Backward_Top300 -0.002 -0.003 0.002 -0.004 -0.012 
 [-0.58] [-1.12] [1.28] [-1.77]* [-1.00] 
Forward spillover (Top-300) -0.293 -0.231 -0.156 -0.205 -0.142 
 [-37.34]*** [-28.87]*** [-33.08]*** [-28.47]*** [-3.94]*** 
Overhang x Forward_Top300 0.019 0.020 -0.000 0.017 0.027 
 [7.30]*** [7.56]*** [-0.02] [8.46]*** [2.44]** 
Constant 9.422 9.074 1.205 5.760 7.396 
 [77.99]*** [73.61]*** [16.57]*** [56.03]*** [12.38]*** 
      
Observations 336,193 336,234 349,226 364,867 73,508 
R-squared 0.853 0.790 0.952 0.960 0.862 
Notes: Dependent variable:  log of headline variable. Fixed effects estimations. Standard errors clustered at 
industry level. Robust t-statistics in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 6 presents results for all five CESEE countries for main variables of interest with TFP, 
employment and investment as the dependent variables (without controlling for the crisis and 
firm size).
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 In line with expectations, results show that in all five countries firms’ own debt 
overhang is a big drag on firm performance, reducing TFP growth as well as employment 
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and investment growth. The only exceptions relate to investment growth in Hungary and 
Bulgaria, where the coefficients are insignificant, and in Serbia where the coefficient is 
positive and significant. Similarly, high debt leverage of the 300 most indebted companies in 
the same industry drives down a company’s performance in terms of TFP, employment and 
investment. Where insignificant (for example in Romania), these horizontal debt spillovers 
turn negative and significant once controlling for firms’ own debt overhang. 
For most of the countries, backward debt spillovers from the 300 most indebted firms in the 
downstream industries are surprisingly positive. On the other side, financial distress in 
supplying industries has a general negative impact on firm TFP, employment and investment 
growth. These effects are aggravated when interacted with a firm’s own financial distress. 
This suggests that a firm’s performance is more severely affected by financial health of its 
suppliers rather than customers. In other words, push factors seem to be more important than 
pull factors in terms of financial distress. 
However, it remains to be seen how these relationships evolve once controlling for the crisis 
period. The next section presents these results.  
Table 6: Results for TFP, employment and investment (reduced-form model) 
 
Notes: Dependent variables: log of TFP, employment and investment, respectively. Fixed effects 
estimation. Shaded cells indicate coefficients are significantly different from zero at 10 per cent. Cells 
shaded light red indicate negative coefficients, while cells shaded light blue indicate positive 
coefficients. Coefficients for interaction between correspondent variable and firms’ own debt 
overhang are calculated as the sum of the coefficient of correspondent variable and the interaction 
term coefficient. Country abbreviations are defined in Table 1. 
Source: Tables A1 to A3 in the Appendix. 
 
 
5.2.  Results with control for the crisis effect 
This section presents results for estimating the full model where all variables are interacted 
with the crisis dummy. This makes the output tables more complex. To simplify the 
presentation of results and make it clearer we drop t-statistics from the presentation tables 
and calculate effects for individual variables accounting for the interaction terms with the 
crisis period. We present coefficients for pre-crisis and post-crisis period, whereby the latter 
are calculated as the sum of the pre-crisis coefficients and the interaction term coefficients. 
We present only results for two dependent variables of interest – employment and 
investment.
18
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HR HU BG RO RS
Debt overhang -0.058 -0.044 -0.081 -0.113 -0.160
Hor. spillover (Top-300) -0.004 -0.001 -0.069 0.031 0.037
Overhang x Hor_Top300 -0.004 -0.001 0.031 -0.025 0.037
Backward spillover (Top-300) 0.320 -0.036 0.365 -0.125 0.551
Overhang x Backward_Top300 0.320 -0.036 0.245 -0.125 0.575
Forward spillover (Top-300) -0.293 0.039 -0.226 0.060 -0.295
Overhang x Forward_Top300 -0.274 0.050 -0.226 0.132 -0.341
Debt overhang -0.007 -0.004 -0.016 -0.026 -0.018
Hor. spillover (Top-300) -0.002 0.000 -0.012 -0.007 0.000
Overhang x Hor_Top300 -0.002 0.000 -0.012 -0.007 0.000
Backward spillover (Top-300) 0.059 0.012 -0.469 0.000 0.113
Overhang x Backward_Top300 0.059 0.021 -0.445 0.033 0.113
Forward spillover (Top-300) -0.156 -0.013 0.222 -0.006 -0.152
Overhang x Forward_Top300 -0.156 -0.019 0.199 -0.036 -0.152
Debt overhang -0.019 -0.001 0.003 -0.026 0.020
Hor. spillover (Top-300) -0.002 -0.005 -0.034 0.004 0.068
Overhang x Hor_Top300 -0.002 -0.005 -0.034 -0.035 0.068
Backward spillover (Top-300) 0.199 0.000 0.209 -0.036 0.700
Overhang x Backward_Top300 0.195 0.000 0.186 0.015 0.733
Forward spillover (Top-300) -0.205 -0.001 -0.143 0.032 -0.297
Overhang x Forward_Top300 -0.188 0.012 -0.125 0.032 -0.297
TFP
Employment
Investment
 5.2.1.  Results for employment 
Probably the most interesting finding in Table 7 refers to the pre- and post-crisis effect of 
firms’ own financial distress. Before the crisis, firms’ own financial distress was generally 
tolerated in all of the countries, that is employment growth was not negatively affected 
regardless of whether a firm was in financial distress or not. Only in Croatia was this effect 
on employment growth slightly negative. It is only after the start of the crisis in late 2008 
when firms got punished for their pre-crisis excess borrowing. Banks put a stop on further 
borrowing/refinancing. Along with this, the signs of own debt overhang coefficients 
generally turn from positive to negative, indicating that firms started a painful deleveraging 
process along with laying off of workers once “the hard stop” hit in 2009 and after. 
 
Table 7: Pre- and post-crisis effects of own financial conditions and debt spillovers on 
employment 
  Crisis HR BG RO RS HU 
Return on equity pre- 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.030 
 
post- 0.006 0.025 0.024 0.026 0.060 
Interest rate coverage pre- 0.002 0.034 -0.001 0.013 0.000 
  post- 0.004 0.014 0.002 0.013 0.000 
Liquidity ratio pre- -0.005 -0.026 -0.022 0.000 -0.011 
 
post- -0.005 -0.026 -0.022 0.000 -0.004 
Own debt overhang pre- -0.0002 0.007 0.001 0.004 0.001 
  post- -0.004 -0.025 -0.029 -0.025 -0.007 
Hor. spillover (top 100) pre- 0.000 -0.008 -0.008 0.000 0.001 
 
post- 0.000 -0.015 -0.002 0.000 -0.001 
Backward spillover (top 100) pre- -0.0003 -0.041 0.018 -0.056 0.009 
  post- 0.004 -0.033 0.018 -0.053 0.018 
Forward spillover (top 100) pre- -0.058 0.010 -0.024 0.026 -0.010 
 
post- -0.040 0.004 -0.010 -0.073 -0.004 
Hor. spillover (top 300) pre- 0.000 0.001 -0.009 0.000 0.001 
  post- 0.000 -0.011 -0.004 -0.023 -0.001 
Backward spillover (top 300) pre- -0.001 -0.075 0.025 -0.006 0.012 
 
post- 0.005 -0.063 0.025 -0.003 0.015 
Forward spillover (top 300) pre- -0.063 0.042 -0.029 -0.017 -0.013 
  post- -0.047 0.027 -0.018 -0.109 -0.026 
Notes: Dependent variable: log employment. Fixed effects estimation.Shaded cells indicate 
coefficients are significantly different from zero at 10 per cent. Cells shaded light red indicate 
negative coefficients, while cells shaded light blue indicate positive coefficients. Coefficients for 
interaction between correspondent variable and crisis dummy are calculated as the sum of the 
coefficient of correspondent variable and the crisis interaction term coefficient. Country abbreviations 
are defined in Table 1. 
Source: Table A4 in the Appendix. 
 
In terms of debt spillovers, we generally don’t observe such abrupt changes. Coefficients for 
horizontal and vertical spillovers mostly remain significant and consistent both before and 
after the crisis. In most cases the negative debt spillovers become even stronger after the 
outburst of the crisis. In other words, excessive debt of largest debtor firms either in the same 
industry (horizontal spillovers) or in the buying and supplying industries has a negative 
impact on firm employment growth for the most part, but it became even more pronounced 
after the crisis began. These results are more pronounced for the top 300 most indebted 
firms. 
Chart 12: Forward debt spillover effects of the top 100 and top 300 debtor firms on 
employment in the post-crisis period 
 
Notes: Coefficients for post-crisis period. If not highlighted, the corresponding coefficient is not 
significantly different from zero. Country abbreviations are defined in Table 1. 
Source: Table A4 in the Appendix. 
 
Chart 12 shows the post-crisis forward debt spillover effects of debt overhang of the 100 and 
300 largest debtor firms on employment growth. With the exception of Bulgaria these effects 
are largely negative. The economic interpretation of the results is as follows: an increase in 
debt overhang by the top 100 most indebted companies in downstream industries by 10 per 
cent leads to lower employment growth in the post-crisis period by 0.1-0.7 per cent. For the 
top 300 most indebted customers these effects increase to the range of 0.2 and 1.0 per cent. 
The strongest debt spillover effects can be observed in Serbia and the weakest in Romania. 
Note that in Bulgaria it is the backward debt spillovers that have a negative impact on 
employment growth. 
 
5.2.2.  Results for investment 
Results obtained for investment as a dependent variable show a similar negative impact of 
own financial distress (which appears to have been mostly tolerated before the crisis) and of 
financial distress in the same industry and downstream industries. The only differences 
compared with the employment variable are that backward debt spillovers seem to be less 
taxing on investment growth than forward debt spillovers (from suppliers). The latter, 
however, become even more punitive after the crisis, in particular wen considering the 
impact of the 300 most indebted companies. In Hungary it is the backward debt spillovers 
that have the punitive impact on investment made by upstream firms. 
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 Table 8: Pre- and post-crisis effects of own financial conditions and debt spillovers on 
investment 
  Crisis HR BG RO RS HU 
Return on equity pre- 0.014 0.000 0.000 -0.047 0.019 
 
post- 0.014 0.025 -0.012 0.030 0.149 
Interest rate coverage pre- 0.004 0.061 0.038 0.057 0.000 
  post- 0.006 0.033 0.029 0.057 0.027 
Liquidity ratio pre- 0.013 -0.060 -0.090 -0.069 0.029 
 
post- 0.013 -0.060 -0.090 -0.155 0.032 
Own debt overhang pre- -0.002 0.043 0.019 0.005 0.002 
  post- -0.011 -0.001 -0.028 0.002 -0.014 
Hor. spillover (top 100) pre- 0.000 -0.039 0.014 0.001 0.000 
 
post- -0.0004 -0.003 0.000 0.001 -0.001 
Backward spillover (top 100) pre- 0.093 0.055 0.029 0.035 0.005 
  post- 0.078 0.001 0.034 0.033 0.008 
Forward spillover (top 100) pre- -0.039 0.157 0.059 0.010 0.000 
 
post- -0.066 0.008 -0.035 -0.015 0.032 
Hor. spillover (top 300) pre- -0.0001 -0.068 0.016 0.002 0.000 
  post- -0.0001 -0.022 0.001 0.004 -0.001 
Backward spillover (top 300) pre- 0.128 0.123 0.030 0.050 -0.005 
 
post- 0.113 0.060 0.036 0.047 -0.002 
Forward spillover (top 300) pre- -0.062 0.119 0.057 -0.008 0.007 
  post- -0.087 -0.033 -0.037 -0.032 0.039 
Notes: Dependent variable: log investment. Fixed effects estimation.Shaded cells indicate 
coefficients are significantly different from zero at 10 per cent. Cells shaded light red indicate 
negative coefficients, while cells shaded light blue indicate positive coefficients. Coefficients for 
interaction between correspondent variable and crisis dummy are calculated as the sum of the 
coefficient of correspondent variable and the crisis interaction term coefficient. Country abbreviations 
are defined in Table 1. 
Source: Table A5 in the Appendix. 
 
As further highlighted in Chart 13, on average, an increase in debt overhang by the top 100 
most indebted upstream customers by 10 per cent leads to lower investment growth by 0.2- 
0.7 per cent. Again, these effects get stronger when taking into account the top 300 instead 
of the top 100 largest debtor companies. In terms of investment, the effects are strongest in 
Croatia and weakest in Bulgaria and Serbia. 
  
Chart 13: Forward debt spillover effects of the top 100 and top 300 debtor firms on investment 
in the post-crisis period 
 
Notes: Coefficients for the post-crisis period. If not highlighted, the corresponding coefficient is not 
significantly different from zero. Country abbreviations are defined in Table 1. 
Source: Table A5 in the Appendix. 
 
5.3.  Results with controls for firm size 
Financial distress becomes even more important when accounting for firm size. Smaller 
firms are believed to be more severely affected by their own financial distress and by 
negative debt spillovers from other firms and industries. In our last specification we estimate 
the model separately for three size classes of firms, that is for small companies (below 50 
employees), medium-sized (between 50 and 250 employees) and large companies (more than 
250 employees). Results (see Chart 14 based on Tables A6 to A10 in the Appendix) show 
that own financial distress becomes a drag on employment only after the crisis and that small 
and medium-sized companies are indeed more likely to be affected by their own financial 
distress and mostly so after the start of the crisis. Only in Romania and Serbia do large firms 
seem to be as severely affected by firms’ own excessive debt as small and medium firms. 
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Chart 14: Impact of own financial distress before and after the crisis on employment when 
controlling for firm size 
 
Notes: Coefficients for interaction between correspondent variable and crisis dummy are calculated 
as the sum of the coefficient of correspondent variable and the crisis interaction term coefficient. If 
not highlighted, the coefficient is not significantly different from zero. Country abbreviations are 
defined in Table 1. 
Source: Tables A6 – A10 in the Appendix. 
 
These firm-size dependent effects can also be observed in terms of debt spillovers. As shown 
in Chart 15, with regard to employment growth, forward debt spillovers of the 300 largest 
debtor firms become negative after the start of the crisis, whereby they are most severely 
taxing on small and medium-sized firms, but less so large firms (with the exception of 
Bulgaria and partly in Serbia). A negative shock of a 10 per cent increase in debt overhang 
of downstream buyers can reduce employment growth of small and medium firms by 
between 0.5 and 2 per cent.  
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 Chart 15: Post-crisis forward debt spillovers of the top 300 debtor firms on employment when 
controlling for firm size 
 
Notes: Dependent variable: log employment. Fixed effects estimation. If not highlighted, the 
corresponding coefficient is not significantly different from zero. Country abbreviations are defined in 
Table 1. 
Source: Tables A6 – A10 in the Appendix. 
 
Very similar effects of vertical debt spillovers can be observed also in terms of investment: it 
is predominantly small and medium-sized companies that are negatively affected by large 
excessive debt of the largest downstream firms (see Chart 16). 
 
Chart 16: Post-crisis forward debt spillovers of the top 300 debtor firms on investment when 
controlling for firm size 
 
Notes: Dependent variable: log investment. Fixed effects estimation. If not highlighted, the 
corresponding coefficient is not significantly different from zero. Country abbreviations are defined in 
Table 1. 
Source: Tables A6 – A10 in the Appendix. 
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6. Economic impact of resolution of excess debt  
Firms with excessive debt have a disproportionately large impact on the aggregate economy 
by affecting other firms within the sector as well as, through forward and backward linkages, 
other sectors in the economy. Large entities with debt overhang in particular affect a broad 
segment of the economy, paralysing other potentially successful firms in addition to the 
negative direct effect on their own performance. In the following section we explore the 
potential aggregate economic effects that the deleveraging process would bring to the 
CESEE countries.  
Given that the negative effects of prolonged excessive indebtedness on firms have been well 
established and that important indirect effects on associated sectors amplify the damage to 
the economy, the easing of the debt burden of the hardest hit firms is in the interest of the 
whole economy. In order to gauge the overall effect of the deleveraging of the worst stricken 
firms on other companies, we present a simulation of the debt reduction on a number of key 
variables.  
Our estimated aggregate effects will be based on the point estimates of elasticities of 
employment, sales and investment with respect to debt overhang. Calculations are based on 
estimated elasticities for the post-crisis period.
19
 We will combine the direct effect of the 
resolution of excessive debt with the (also beneficial) indirect effects, stemming from the 
benefits accruing to horizontally or vertically linked firms. For the sake of simplicity we will 
assume that the impact of debt reduction remains constant both between and within firm 
types. Furthermore, we also assume that the resolution of the debt burden happens 
proportionally across all sectors of the economy or that weighted average across sectors is 
equal to the proposed debt reduction. 
In the simulation of the resolution of the excessive debt problem we anticipate three 
scenarios: 
Scenario 1: Elimination of 20 per cent of debt overhang by the top 100 (300) most indebted 
firms by government debt-reduction policies 
Scenario 2: Elimination of 50 per cent of debt overhang by the top 100 (300) most indebted 
firms 
Scenario 3: Elimination of 100 per cent of debt overhang by the top 100 most indebted 
firms. 
 
The outcomes of the three scenarios for deleveraging the top 100 debtor firms are presented 
in charts 17-19 for sales, employment and investment, respectively. Simulations of effects 
stemming from deleveraging the top 300 debtor firms are in the Appendix (see charts A1-
A3). 
                                                        
19
 See estimated elasticities for employment and investment in Table 6, while for sales additional estimations of 
elasticities were performed (see Table A11 in the Appendix). 
 Chart 17: Overall effects of deleveraging the top 100 most indebted firms on a typical firm’s 
sales (change in firm’s sales in per cent) 
 
Notes: Simulation of elimination of 20 per cent, 50 per cent and 100 per cent of debt overhang by the 
top 100 most indebted firms on an individual firm’s change in sales. Calculations based on estimated 
elasticities for post-crisis period (Table A11 in the Appendix); 90 per cent confidence intervals. 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
Our simulations show that, in terms of sales (see Chart 17), deleveraging of the top 100 most 
indebted firms would most benefit companies in the Romanian economy, with the projected 
increase in individual firm’s sales ranging between 1 (20 per cent decrease in debt overhang) 
and 2.5 per cent (100 per cent decrease in debt overhang). The effects for the remaining 
countries are smaller – up to 1 per cent in Hungary, Bulgaria and Serbia, and up to half a per 
cent only in the most optimistic scenario in Croatia. The 90 per cent confidence intervals, 
however, indicate large volatility of deleveraging spillover effects across firms, in particular 
in Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania. This implies that some firms may indirectly benefit from 
a deleveraging of the top 100 most indebted firms by a larger degree, while some may be 
hurt. 
Chart 18 focuses on employment effects of the easing of the debt burden. We find that firms 
in Serbia and Bulgaria are likely to experience the largest benefits of deleveraging the top 
100 most indebted firms. The projected impact on the employment level in an individual 
firm in both countries is between 2 and 3 per cent for a 100 per cent decrease in debt 
overhang. Companies in Croatia and Romania are also projected to experience sizeable 
effects with a 0.5 to 0.8 per cent increase in firm employment, respectively. The impact is 
very small in Hungary – below 0.25 per cent. Again, dispersion of the indirect gains is wide, 
in particular in Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania. 
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 Chart 18: Overall effects of deleveraging the top 100 most indebted firms on a typical firm’s 
employment (change in firm’s employment in per cent) 
 
Notes: Simulation of elimination of 20 per cent, 50 per cent and 100 per cent of debt overhang by the 
top 100 most indebted firms on an individual firm’s change in employment. Calculations based on 
estimated elasticities for post-crisis period (Table A4 in the Appendix). 90 per cent confidence 
intervals. 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
Finally, Chart 19 depicts the projected effects of deleveraging the top 100 most indebted 
firms on an individual firm’s investment. The growth of firm investment as a consequence of 
excessive debt resolution of the largest debtor firms is expected to be most in Romania and 
Hungary. The effects, though, are comparably smaller relative to those for sales and 
employment, as investment in both countries is only expected to grow by about 1 per cent in 
the best scenario. The impact on firm investment in other countries in our sample is even 
smaller, with effects in Bulgaria and Serbia ranging between 0.2 and 0.4 per cent, while 
firms in the Croatian economy are barely expected to notice a change in investment due to 
the deleveraging of the most indebted firms. As before, dispersion of the indirect gains is 
wide in Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania. 
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Chart 19: Overall effects of deleveraging the top 100 most indebted firms on a typical firm’s 
investment (change in firm’s investment in per cent) 
 
Notes: Simulation of elimination of 20 per cent, 50 per cent and 100 per cent of debt overhang by the 
top 100 most indebted firms on an individual firm’s change in investment. Calculations based on 
estimated elasticities for post-crisis period (Table A5 in the Appendix). 90 per cent confidence 
intervals. 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
We also simulated the effects stemming from deleveraging the top 300 debtor firms (see 
charts A1 to A3 in the Appendix). The effects of deleveraging on firms’ sales, employment 
and investment are bigger, but by the order of magnitude lower than 1. This indicates that 
most of the debt reduction spillover effect comes from excessive debt reduction of the top 
100 firms. 
Note that the projected effects of deleveraging are additional effects only to firms’ own 
deleveraging, that is they represent spillover effects of deleveraging the top 100 (top 300) 
most indebted firms. The size of the effects depend solely on the current debt overhang held 
by the top 100 (top 300) most indebted firms as well as on the estimated elasticities of debt 
overhang for sales, employment and investment. The point estimates on investment are very 
small compared with sales and employment, leading to the conclusion that investment during 
the period in question is not very responsive to changes in debt overhang.  
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7. Conclusions 
This research studies the impact of corporate sector excess leverage on the performance of 
firms in CESEE economies. We first assess the extent of corporate sector excess leverage by 
country and identify groups of the largest companies (from the top 10 to top 300) with regard 
to their excess debt, and then assess their direct macroeconomic importance in terms of debt, 
employment, value added and exports. The main part of the paper deals with estimating a 
debt spillovers model to assess the direct and indirect effects of financial distress on 
horizontally and vertically linked industries. The model is estimated using firm-level data for 
five CESEE countries (Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Romania and Serbia). Our results show 
that firm financial distress was largely tolerated before the crisis, but has become severely 
taxing on firm performance in the post-crisis period. We find substantial negative horizontal 
and vertical debt spillover effects of the most indebted companies on other horizontally or 
vertically linked firms. We also find that a firm’s performance is more severely affected by 
financial distress among its suppliers rather than its customers, indicating that “push” factors 
seem to be more important than “pull” factors in terms of financial distress. Most 
importantly, these effects became aggravated during the financial crisis and are more severe 
for small and medium-sized firms.  
Our results indicate that financial distress has negative spillover effects on the whole 
economy, whereby the “collateral victims” are usually small and medium-sized companies 
that are more heavily dependent on the financial health of their large suppliers and 
customers. Our empirical findings hence suggest that countries need to address the issue of 
excess leverage of the largest debtor companies and design policies supporting the repair of 
their balance sheets. Institutional reforms focusing on debt-resolution frameworks 
specifically targeting “systemically important” larger debtor companies may provide 
essential support to faster economic recovery in some of the debt-ridden CESEE countries. 
Our findings suggest that achieving a timely resolution of NPLs can have far more 
widespread effects than previously believed. SMEs will be the main collateral beneficiaries 
of such a policy.  
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Appendix 
 
Tables 
Table A1: Results for TFP (reduced form model) 
 HR HU BG RO RS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Crisis dummy -0.056 -0.061 -0.044 -0.180 0.171 
 [-21.43]*** [-17.81]*** [-5.07]*** [-54.01]*** [38.96]*** 
Exporter dummy 0.102 0.060   0.007 
 [22.61]*** [8.86]***   [0.18] 
Size (Log empl.) (t-1) 0.291 0.042 0.039 0.090 0.081 
 [71.05]*** [6.47]*** [1.85]* [15.55]*** [8.90]*** 
Log K/L ratio (t-1) 0.175 0.004 -0.011 0.064 0.040 
 [56.67]*** [1.40] [-0.61] [16.81]*** [6.76]*** 
Return on equity (t-1) 0.044 0.012 0.046 0.054 0.058 
 [15.70]*** [4.76]*** [8.99]*** [27.32]*** [23.14]*** 
Interest rate coverage (t-1) 0.008 -0.003 0.012 0.048 0.019 
 [14.22]*** [-0.60] [2.25]** [24.00]*** [7.47]*** 
Liquidity ratio (t-1) -0.027 -0.024 -0.041 -0.045 -0.042 
 [-7.86]*** [-6.23]*** [-7.06]*** [-12.03]*** [-9.77]*** 
Debt overhang -0.058 -0.044 -0.081 -0.113 -0.160 
 [-140.29]*** [-64.89]*** [-10.34]*** [-24.10]*** [-49.33]*** 
Hor. spillover (Top-300) -0.004 -0.001 -0.069 0.031 0.037 
 [-6.98]*** [-2.13]** [-3.98]*** [24.41]*** [4.61]*** 
Overhang x Hor_Top300 0.000 0.001 0.100 -0.056 0.011 
 [0.51] [0.95] [2.78]*** [-4.00]*** [0.78] 
Backward spillover (Top-300) 0.320 -0.036 0.365 -0.125 0.551 
 [27.32]*** [-7.60]*** [3.88]*** [-15.28]*** [12.00]*** 
Overhang x Backward_Top300 -0.002 0.000 -0.120 -0.029 0.024 
 [-0.58] [0.03] [-2.98]*** [-0.74] [1.85]* 
Forward spillover (Top-300) -0.293 0.039 -0.226 0.060 -0.295 
 [-37.34]*** [9.12]*** [-2.84]*** [7.28]*** [-7.42]*** 
Overhang x Forward_Top300 0.019 0.011 -0.012 0.072 -0.046 
 [7.30]*** [2.39]** [-0.47] [2.36]** [-4.05]*** 
Constant 9.422 9.526 2.464 3.156 0.082 
 [77.99]*** [156.72]*** [10.75]*** [198.81]*** [0.79] 
      
Observations 336,193 238,838 31,306 194,100 64,837 
R-squared 0.853 0.937 0.902 0.705 0.797 
 
Notes: Dependent variable:  Log of total factor productivity (Olley-Pakes TFP). Fixed effects 
estimation. The model includes time fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at industry level. 
Robust t-statistics in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Country abbreviations are defined in 
Table 1. 
 
Table A2: Results for employment (reduced form model) 
 HR HU BG RO RS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Crisis dummy -0.004 -0.049 0.070 -0.027 0.045 
 [-2.51]** [-23.71]*** [38.70]*** [-17.18]*** [27.04]*** 
Exporter dummy 0.062 0.048   0.072 
 [20.63]*** [11.38]***   [3.89]*** 
Size (Log empl.) (t-1) 0.594 0.242 0.358 0.556 0.562 
 [170.16]*** [48.44]*** [82.34]*** [155.97]*** [119.33]*** 
Log K/L ratio (t-1) 0.044 0.044 0.019 0.015 0.015 
 [25.38]*** [24.47]*** [6.62]*** [10.20]*** [7.73]*** 
Return on equity (t-1) 0.018 0.025 0.025 0.028 0.020 
 [11.44]*** [17.44]*** [24.98]*** [29.47]*** [21.02]*** 
Interest rate coverage (t-1) 0.006 0.003 0.019 -0.002 0.010 
 [16.47]*** [1.19] [16.61]*** [-2.64]*** [10.89]*** 
Liquidity ratio (t-1) 0.008 -0.003 -0.011 -0.017 -0.001 
 [4.43]*** [-1.49] [-10.21]*** [-9.35]*** [-0.61] 
Debt overhang -0.007 -0.004 -0.016 -0.026 -0.018 
 [-31.43]*** [-11.19]*** [-10.27]*** [-14.49]*** [-16.17]*** 
Hor. spillover (Top-300) -0.002 0.000 -0.012 -0.007 -0.005 
 [-6.57]*** [0.42] [-3.14]*** [-11.86]*** [-1.58] 
Overhang x Hor_Top300 0.000 -0.000 -0.008 -0.008 -0.002 
 [0.21] [-0.83] [-0.97] [-0.93] [-0.38] 
Backward spillover (Top-300) 0.059 0.012 -0.469 0.003 0.113 
 [8.37]*** [4.18]*** [-21.89]*** [0.74] [6.14]*** 
Overhang x Backward_Top300 0.002 0.009 0.024 0.033 0.002 
 [1.28] [2.87]*** [2.56]** [1.84]* [0.35] 
Forward spillover (Top-300) -0.156 -0.013 0.222 -0.006 -0.152 
 [-33.08]*** [-5.50]*** [12.18]*** [-1.61] [-9.46]*** 
Overhang x Forward_Top300 -0.000 -0.006 -0.023 -0.030 -0.001 
 [-0.02] [-2.20]** [-3.46]*** [-2.12]** [-0.32] 
Constant 1.205 0.796 3.738 1.071 1.173 
 [16.57]*** [25.86]*** [78.74]*** [110.18]*** [26.61]*** 
      
Observations 349,226 321,696 459,258 303,145 188,759 
R-squared 0.952 0.971 0.934 0.950 0.943 
Notes: Dependent variable:  Log of employment. Fixed effects estimation. The model includes time 
fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at industry level. Robust t-statistics in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. Country abbreviations are defined in Table 1. 
 
 
Table A3: Results for investment (reduced form model) 
 HR HU BG RO RS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
           
Crisis dummy -0.018 -0.045 0.028 0.002 0.153 
 [-7.79]*** [-11.84]*** [8.26]*** [0.81] [38.43]*** 
Exporter dummy 0.065 0.048   0.089 
 [17.17]*** [6.77]***   [2.09]** 
Size (Log empl.) (t-1) 0.648 0.279 0.275 0.306 0.523 
 [140.80]*** [42.15]*** [37.58]*** [62.58]*** [64.42]*** 
Log K/L ratio (t-1) 0.530 0.206 0.050 0.073 0.142 
 [100.39]*** [38.32]*** [8.32]*** [24.01]*** [25.95]*** 
Return on equity (t-1) 0.015 0.045 0.017 -0.006 0.005 
 [5.21]*** [17.05]*** [8.93]*** [-3.75]*** [2.26]** 
Interest rate coverage (t-1) 0.002 -0.002 0.039 0.041 0.061 
 [4.18]*** [-0.30] [18.73]*** [23.84]*** [26.46]*** 
Liquidity ratio (t-1) 0.026 0.003 -0.056 -0.091 -0.115 
 [9.33]*** [0.85] [-25.78]*** [-26.28]*** [-26.53]*** 
Debt overhang -0.019 -0.001 0.003 -0.026 0.020 
 [-56.92]*** [-1.22] [1.21] [-7.74]*** [8.54]*** 
Hor. spillover (Top-300) -0.002 -0.005 -0.034 0.004 0.068 
 [-4.93]*** [-10.37]*** [-5.13]*** [3.87]*** [8.71]*** 
Overhang x Hor_Top300 -0.000 0.001 0.007 -0.039 -0.012 
 [-0.57] [1.27] [0.53] [-2.80]*** [-1.01] 
Backward spillover (Top-300) 0.199 0.004 0.209 -0.036 0.700 
 [19.42]*** [0.89] [5.30]*** [-5.18]*** [16.33]*** 
Overhang x Backward_Top300 -0.004 -0.007 -0.023 0.051 0.033 
 [-1.77]* [-1.33] [-1.57] [1.74]* [2.41]** 
Forward spillover (Top-300) -0.205 -0.001 -0.143 0.032 -0.297 
 [-28.47]*** [-0.13] [-4.14]*** [4.64]*** [-7.92]*** 
Overhang x Forward_Top300 0.017 0.013 0.018 -0.009 -0.009 
 [8.46]*** [2.70]*** [1.83]* [-0.40] [-1.14] 
Constant 5.760 6.936 2.324 3.655 -2.816 
 [56.03]*** [112.33]*** [23.64]*** [254.18]*** [-24.72]*** 
      
Observations 364,867 320,143 307,218 262,638 162,543 
R-squared 0.960 0.972 0.932 0.892 0.890 
Notes: Dependent variable: Log of investment. Fixed effects estimation. The model includes time 
fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at industry level. Robust t-statistics in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. Country abbreviations are defined in Table 1. 
 
 
Table A4: Results for employment (full model) 
  HR HU BG RO RS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
       
Crisis dummy -0.451 -0.306 0.027 -0.281 1.199 
 [-8.78]*** [-4.79]*** [0.30] [-24.13]*** [11.70]*** 
Exporter dummy 0.040 0.061   0.063 
 [21.74]*** [24.04]***     [3.21]*** 
Size (Log empl.) (t-1) 0.666 0.484 0.351 0.554 0.535 
 [81.13]*** [178.35]*** [79.52]*** [154.45]*** [99.44]*** 
Log K/L ratio (t-1) 0.017 0.094 0.021 0.017 0.016 
 [22.53]*** [56.28]*** [7.13]*** [10.93]*** [6.73]*** 
Return on equity (t-1) 0.006 0.030 0.006 0.009 0.005 
 [5.66]*** [9.49]*** [2.36]** [6.91]*** [2.67]*** 
Crisis x return on equity (t-1) -0.001 0.030 0.025 0.024 0.021 
 [-0.90] [7.53]*** [10.19]*** [16.31]*** [11.04]*** 
Interest rate coverage (t-1) 0.002 0.004 0.034 -0.001 0.013 
 [6.12]*** [1.47] [17.02]*** [-0.42] [7.60]*** 
Crisis x int. rate cover. (t-1) 0.002 0.000 -0.020 0.003 -0.002 
 [6.30]*** [0.14] [-9.86]*** [1.85]* [-1.24] 
Liquidity ratio (t-1) -0.005 -0.011 -0.026 -0.022 0.000 
 [-4.34]*** [-8.05]*** [-9.82]*** [-8.04]*** [-0.02] 
Crisis x liquidity ratio (t-1) 0.009 0.007 0.015 0.008 0.000 
 [8.61]*** [5.12]*** [5.51]*** [3.03]*** [-0.01] 
Debt overhang -0.0002 0.001 0.007 0.001 0.004 
 [-1.06] [4.98]*** [1.75]* [0.21] [1.86]* 
Crisis x debt overhang -0.004 -0.008 -0.032 -0.030 -0.029 
 [-19.73]*** [-30.11]*** [-7.77]*** [-6.19]*** [-11.83]*** 
Hor. spillover (Top-300) -0.0001 0.001 0.001 -0.009 0.014 
 [-0.31] [3.09]*** [0.09] [-9.76]*** [2.64]*** 
Crisis x Hor_Top-300 -0.001 -0.002 -0.012 0.005 -0.023 
 [-5.08]*** [-5.62]*** [-3.11]*** [5.23]*** [-6.55]*** 
Backward spillover (Top-300) -0.001 0.012 -0.075 0.025 -0.006 
 [-0.18] [5.27]*** [-36.15]*** [5.60]*** [-0.27] 
Crisis x Backward_Top-300 0.006 0.003 0.012 0.001 0.003 
 [7.63]*** [2.47]** [3.12]*** [0.52] [1.07] 
Forward spillover (Top-300) -0.063 -0.013 0.042 -0.029 -0.017 
 [-17.35]*** [-6.61]*** [20.69]*** [-7.13]*** [-0.83] 
Crisis x Forward_Top-300 0.016 0.013 -0.015 0.011 -0.092 
 [5.88]*** [3.17]*** [-1.55] [3.95]*** [-10.50]*** 
Constant 1.127 -0.090 4.179 1.175 0.837 
 [28.18]*** [-4.34]*** [42.39]*** [83.99]*** [7.96]*** 
      
Observations 364,995 694,769 459,258 303,145 154,684 
R-squared 0.947 0.947 0.933 0.950 0.931 
Notes: Dependent variable:  Log of Employment. Fixed effects estimation. Standard errors clustered 
at industry level. Robust t-statistics in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Country abbreviations 
are defined in Table 1. 
 
 
Table A5: Results for investment (full model) 
  HR HU BG RO RS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
       
Crisis dummy 0.759 -0.626 1.546 0.462 2.725 
 [5.82]*** [-8.84]*** [8.55]*** [20.89]*** [11.25]*** 
Exporter dummy 0.073 0.066   0.067 
 [18.47]*** [25.11]***   [1.51] 
Size (Log empl.) (t-1) 1.309 0.521 0.273 0.307 0.501 
 [105.09]*** [179.35]*** [37.36]*** [62.77]*** [55.26]*** 
Log K/L ratio (t-1) 0.492 0.454 0.050 0.070 0.157 
 [97.12]*** [156.98]*** [8.27]*** [23.17]*** [24.50]*** 
Return on equity (t-1) 0.014 0.019 -0.004 0.003 -0.047 
 [3.55]*** [3.64]*** [-0.72] [1.42] [-11.45]*** 
Crisis x Return on equity (t-1) 0.004 0.130 0.025 -0.012 0.077 
 [0.76] [18.98]*** [4.33]*** [-4.26]*** [17.24]*** 
Interest rate coverage (t-1) 0.004 0.003 0.061 0.038 0.057 
 [4.47]*** [0.88] [13.09]*** [12.86]*** [14.08]*** 
Crisis x Int. rate cover. (t-1) 0.002 0.027 -0.028 -0.009 0.001 
 [2.50]** [8.47]*** [-5.86]*** [-2.55]** [0.17] 
Liquidity ratio (t-1) 0.013 0.029 -0.060 -0.090 -0.069 
 [3.20]*** [16.83]*** [-9.37]*** [-15.91]*** [-6.28]*** 
Crisis x Liquidity ratio (t-1) 0.003 0.003 0.004 -0.002 -0.086 
 [0.87] [1.80]* [0.58] [-0.33] [-7.83]*** 
Debt overhang -0.002 0.002 0.043 0.019 0.048 
 [-6.47]*** [8.48]*** [7.11]*** [1.91]* [9.68]*** 
Crisis x Debt overhang -0.009 -0.016 -0.044 -0.047 -0.027 
 [-21.18]*** [-54.54]*** [-6.83]*** [-4.46]*** [-4.94]*** 
Hor. spillover (Top-300) -0.0001 0.000 -0.068 0.016 0.017 
 [-0.24] [0.27] [-6.28]*** [8.98]*** [1.43] 
Crisis x Hor_Top-300 0.000 -0.001 0.046 -0.015 0.023 
 [0.04] [-4.35]*** [5.32]*** [-7.39]*** [2.90]*** 
Backward spillover (Top-300) 0.128 -0.005 0.123 0.030 0.504 
 [11.69]*** [-2.13]** [3.22]*** [3.60]*** [10.57]*** 
Crisis x Backward_Top-300 -0.015 0.003 -0.063 0.006 -0.037 
 [-7.49]*** [1.86]* [-6.90]*** [1.17] [-4.97]*** 
Forward spillover (Top-300) -0.062 0.007 0.119 0.057 -0.078 
 [-6.89]*** [3.22]*** [3.09]*** [7.64]*** [-1.62] 
Crisis x Forward_Top-300 -0.025 0.032 -0.152 -0.094 -0.240 
 [-3.86]*** [7.47]*** [-8.36]*** [-17.33]*** [-11.79]*** 
Constant 3.857 5.436 1.028 3.221 -2.255 
 [39.09]*** [173.02]*** [5.32]*** [135.89]*** [-9.07]*** 
      
Observations 364,867 707,674 307,218 262,638 144,582 
R-squared 0.957 0.970 0.932 0.892 0.885 
Notes: Dependent variable:  Log of investment. Fixed effects estimation. Standard errors clustered at 
industry level. Robust t-statistics in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Country abbreviations 
are defined in Table 1. 
 
 
Table A6: Results accounting for company size, Croatia 
  Employment Investment 
  Small Medium Large Small Medium Large 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
        
Crisis dummy -0.428 -2.683 -27.187 0.711 5.918 4.557 
 [-8.60]*** [-1.09] [-1.32] [5.46]*** [2.93]*** [1.11] 
Exporter dummy 0.039 0.186 -0.189 0.073 0.255 0.054 
 [21.85]*** [1.62] [-0.49] [18.39]*** [2.62]*** [0.36] 
Size (Log empl.) (t-1) 0.663 0.705 0.861 1.322 0.853 0.654 
 [80.90]*** [5.91]*** [1.92]* [109.30]*** [5.44]*** [6.57]*** 
Log K/L ratio (t-1) 0.017 -0.065 -0.081 0.493 0.469 0.335 
 [22.87]*** [-0.60] [-0.13] [97.13]*** [4.18]*** [1.72]* 
Return on equity (t-1) 0.007 -0.402 2.827 0.014 -0.154 0.319 
 [6.12]*** [-1.52] [1.21] [3.55]*** [-0.89] [1.09] 
Crisis x Return on equity (t-1) -0.002 0.506 -2.976 0.004 0.226 0.109 
 [-1.21] [1.96]* [-1.14] [0.70] [1.29] [0.36] 
Interest rate coverage (t-1) 0.002 -0.035 -0.003 0.004 -0.019 -0.044 
 [6.62]*** [-0.94] [-0.01] [4.51]*** [-0.69] [-0.79] 
Crisis x Int. rate cover. (t-1) 0.002 0.054 0.380 0.002 -0.093 -0.077 
 [5.99]*** [1.51] [1.01] [2.58]*** [-1.66]* [-0.91] 
Liquidity ratio (t-1) -0.005 -0.116 0.175 0.013 -0.109 0.050 
 [-4.30]*** [-1.07] [0.14] [3.26]*** [-1.45] [0.15] 
Crisis x Liquidity ratio (t-1) 0.009 -0.087 -0.050 0.003 0.292 -0.249 
 [8.69]*** [-0.99] [-0.05] [0.81] [2.49]** [-1.04] 
Debt overhang -0.000 -0.002 0.022 -0.003 0.009 -0.003 
 [-1.26] [-0.55] [0.63] [-6.62]*** [3.10]*** [-0.23] 
Crisis x Debt overhang -0.004 0.001 -0.019 -0.009 -0.012 -0.012 
 [-20.32]*** [0.09] [-0.58] [-21.13]*** [-2.24]** [-1.32] 
Hor. spillover (Top-300) 0.000 0.002 0.119 0.000 -0.002 0.000 
 [0.90] [0.42] [1.14] [0.05] [-0.40] [0.02] 
Crisis x Hor_Top-300 0.000 -0.003 -0.059 -0.000 0.009 -0.036 
 [-2.03]** [-0.86] [-0.45] [-1.22] [1.28] [-1.86]* 
Backward spillover (Top-300) -0.000 0.151 -1.240 0.093 -0.109 -0.278 
 [-0.06] [1.16] [-0.88] [11.29]*** [-0.73] [-1.51] 
Crisis x Backward_Top-300 0.004 -0.016 0.157 -0.014 -0.035 0.000 
 [5.90]*** [-0.68] [0.62] [-7.45]*** [-1.24] [-0.00] 
Forward spillover (Top-300) -0.057 -0.218 0.145 -0.040 0.108 0.362 
 [-18.90]*** [-2.27]** [0.12] [-5.31]*** [1.16] [2.23]** 
Crisis x Forward_Top-300 0.017 0.146 1.276 -0.025 -0.275 -0.177 
 [7.23]*** [1.23] [1.43] [-4.23]*** [-2.91]*** [-0.94] 
Constant 1.111 3.670 19.285 3.856 7.365 8.736 
 [28.25]*** [1.58] [1.12] [39.05]*** [4.36]*** [2.12]** 
       
Observations 363,697 1,226 72 363,569 1,226 72 
R-squared 0.941 0.754 0.554 0.956 0.918 0.990 
Notes: Dependent variable:  Log of column headline variable. Fixed effects estimation. Standard errors clustered 
at industry level. Robust t-statistics in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Table A7: Results accounting for company size, Hungary 
  Employment Investment 
  Small Medium Large Small Medium Large 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
        
Crisis dummy -0.304 -0.290 -0.482 -0.600 -1.190 -0.722 
 [-4.62]*** [-0.98] [-0.42] [-8.19]*** [-4.67]*** [-1.13] 
Exporter dummy 0.062 0.040 0.104 0.067 0.053 0.039 
 [23.81]*** [3.19]*** [2.15]** [24.58]*** [4.66]*** [1.07] 
Size (Log empl.) (t-1) 0.480 0.578 0.464 0.522 0.532 0.450 
 [181.23]*** [24.24]*** [7.19]*** [179.60]*** [23.18]*** [7.84]*** 
Log K/L ratio (t-1) 0.094 0.107 0.097 0.452 0.529 0.503 
 [56.64]*** [4.42]*** [1.48] [154.78]*** [23.50]*** [8.88]*** 
Return on equity (t-1) 0.030 0.116 -0.048 0.021 -0.038 -0.123 
 [9.34]*** [2.94]*** [-0.62] [3.89]*** [-0.86] [-1.46] 
Crisis x Return on equity (t-1) 0.029 0.152 0.192 0.128 0.288 0.218 
 [7.26]*** [1.72]* [1.65]* [18.45]*** [5.28]*** [1.87]* 
Interest rate coverage (t-1) 0.004 0.003 -0.017 0.004 -0.001 -0.007 
 [1.30] [0.47] [-0.40] [1.29] [-0.10] [-0.31] 
Crisis x Int. rate cover. (t-1) 0.001 -0.009 0.020 0.026 0.017 0.028 
 [0.43] [-1.20] [0.47] [7.55]*** [2.11]** [1.18] 
Liquidity ratio (t-1) -0.011 -0.017 -0.017 0.028 0.076 0.133 
 [-8.01]*** [-0.84] [-0.25] [16.20]*** [4.49]*** [3.01]*** 
Crisis x Liquidity ratio (t-1) 0.007 -0.012 0.038 0.004 0.007 -0.055 
 [5.13]*** [-0.68] [0.75] [2.21]** [0.51] [-1.49] 
Debt overhang 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.006 0.004 
 [4.90]*** [1.37] [0.90] [7.35]*** [6.69]*** [1.84]* 
Crisis x Debt overhang -0.008 -0.007 -0.006 -0.017 -0.009 -0.006 
 [-29.20]*** [-6.39]*** [-2.39]** [-53.46]*** [-9.19]*** [-2.97]*** 
Hor. spillover (Top-300) 0.001 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 [3.73]*** [0.51] [-0.21] [-0.25] [0.54] [-0.24] 
Crisis x Hor_Top-300 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 
 [-7.80]*** [-1.20] [-0.83] [-3.32]*** [-0.51] [-0.04] 
Backward spillover (Top-300) 0.009 0.017 0.028 0.004 0.005 -0.011 
 [3.91]*** [1.95]* [1.14] [1.73]* [0.62] [-0.60] 
Crisis x Backward_Top-300 0.009 -0.000 -0.008 0.004 -0.002 0.013 
 [5.45]*** [-0.03] [-0.40] [2.13]** [-0.42] [0.97] 
Forward spillover (Top-300) -0.010 -0.018 -0.029 -0.001 -0.002 0.010 
 [-4.64]*** [-2.20]** [-1.24] [-0.48] [-0.29] [0.56] 
Crisis x Forward_Top-300 0.006 0.013 0.029 0.030 0.067 0.031 
 [1.63] [0.81] [0.54] [7.69]*** [5.19]*** [0.98] 
Constant -0.139 0.884 2.098 5.393 6.223 7.657 
 [-6.69]*** [3.04]*** [2.80]*** [170.52]*** [21.16]*** [9.23]*** 
       
Observations 671,312 20,643 2,814 684,196 20,660 2,818 
R-squared 0.928 0.796 0.770 0.965 0.964 0.969 
Notes: Dependent variable:  Log of column headline variable. Fixed effects estimation. Standard 
errors clustered at industry level. Robust t-statistics in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Table A8: Results accounting for company size, Bulgaria 
  Employment Investment 
  Small Medium Large Small Medium Large 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
        
Crisis dummy 0.039 -0.309 -0.699 1.599 1.251 -1.018 
 [0.38] [-1.40] [-1.02] [7.98]*** [3.37]*** [-0.65] 
Exporter dummy       
       
Size (Log empl.) (t-1) 0.332 0.573 0.56 0.274 0.305 0.139 
 [69.87]*** [33.05]*** [9.55]*** [34.35]*** [14.29]*** [2.59]*** 
Log K/L ratio (t-1) 0.022 0.002 0.035 0.056 0.005 -0.062 
 [6.36]*** [0.30] [2.11]** [8.39]*** [0.42] [-1.53] 
Return on equity (t-1) 0.005 0.016 0.005 -0.004 -0.008 -0.055 
 [1.89]* [2.58]*** [0.35] [-0.58] [-0.65] [-1.18] 
Crisis x Return on equity (t-1) 0.025 0.012 0.028 0.024 0.032 0.094 
 [9.16]*** [1.70]* [1.72]* [3.76]*** [2.51]** [1.85]* 
Interest rate coverage (t-1) 0.040 -0.004 -0.026 0.068 0.025 -0.050 
 [18.14]*** [-0.86] [-1.95]* [13.16]*** [2.27]** [-1.87]* 
Crisis x Int. rate cover. (t-1) -0.023 0.005 0.019 -0.032 -0.017 0.056 
 [-10.31]*** [0.97] [1.18] [-6.13]*** [-1.44] [1.75]* 
Liquidity ratio (t-1) -0.026 -0.021 0.030 -0.061 -0.063 0.047 
 [-9.18]*** [-2.17]** [0.38] [-9.01]*** [-3.33]*** [0.53] 
Crisis x Liquidity ratio (t-1) 0.015 0.005 -0.07 0.006 -0.01 -0.086 
 [5.31]*** [0.51] [-0.85] [0.89] [-0.54] [-0.99] 
Debt overhang 0.009 0.003 -0.018 0.044 0.042 0.000 
 [1.99]** [0.33] [-1.50] [6.66]*** [2.69]*** [-0.00] 
Crisis x Debt overhang -0.032 -0.035 -0.056 -0.042 -0.064 -0.021 
 [-7.21]*** [-3.45]*** [-1.60] [-6.12]*** [-3.77]*** [-0.42] 
Hor. spillover (Top-300) -0.014 0.017 0.028 -0.053 0.039 0.025 
 [-2.89]*** [2.09]** [2.48]** [-5.48]*** [2.09]** [0.25] 
Crisis x Hor_Top-300 -0.003 -0.019 -0.036 0.048 -0.034 -0.033 
 [-0.67] [-2.56]** [-3.00]*** [5.23]*** [-1.97]** [-0.35] 
Backward spillover (Top-300) -0.428 -0.072 -0.044 0.060 0.107 0.057 
 [-25.99]*** [-1.76]* [-0.33] [1.90]* [1.32] [0.20] 
Crisis x Backward_Top-300 0.005 0.001 0.021 -0.064 0.005 0.024 
 [1.18] [0.10] [1.33] [-6.07]*** [0.32] [0.41] 
Forward spillover (Top-300) 0.119 -0.180 -0.184 0.166 0.060 0.152 
 [7.01]*** [-4.20]*** [-1.84]* [5.02]*** [0.76] [0.55] 
Crisis x Forward_Top-300 -0.008 0.043 0.077 -0.158 -0.101 0.065 
 [-0.77] [1.83]* [1.07] [-8.05]*** [-2.60]*** [0.41] 
Constant 4.191 4.230 4.694 0.944 1.973 2.656 
 [38.97]*** [16.62]*** [5.94]*** [4.45]*** [4.50]*** [1.51] 
       
Observations 432,434 24,097 2,727 290,314 16,042 862 
R-squared 0.907 0.731 0.698 0.929 0.870 0.887 
Notes: Dependent variable:  Log of column headline variable. Fixed effects estimation. Standard 
errors clustered at industry level. Robust t-statistics in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Table A9: Results accounting for company size,  Romania 
  Employment Investment 
  Small Medium Large Small Medium Large 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
        
Crisis dummy -0.322 -0.085 -0.070 0.471 0.378 0.297 
 [-24.78]*** [-3.06]*** [-1.04] [19.98]*** [6.03]*** [1.08] 
Exporter dummy       
       
Size (Log empl.) (t-1) 0.543 0.630 0.723 0.303 0.366 0.177 
 [145.59]*** [45.93]*** [17.75]*** [58.92]*** [21.60]*** [3.11]*** 
Log K/L ratio (t-1) 0.019 0.000 0.005 0.071 0.059 0.015 
 [11.29]*** [0.06] [0.54] [21.86]*** [7.82]*** [0.38] 
Return on equity (t-1) 0.008 0.014 0.018 0.004 -0.001 -0.008 
 [5.85]*** [3.77]*** [2.16]** [1.46] [-0.08] [-0.24] 
Crisis x Return on equity (t-1) 0.024 0.023 0.014 -0.012 -0.015 0.045 
 [14.86]*** [5.04]*** [1.13] [-4.06]*** [-1.75]* [1.36] 
Interest rate coverage (t-1) 0.001 -0.014 -0.002 0.041 0.009 0.046 
 [0.81] [-4.04]*** [-0.19] [12.89]*** [1.24] [1.17] 
Crisis x Int. rate cover. (t-1) 0.004 0.008 -0.002 -0.009 -0.006 -0.004 
 [1.83]* [2.00]** [-0.16] [-2.42]** [-0.72] [-0.09] 
Liquidity ratio (t-1) -0.024 -0.021 -0.002 -0.086 -0.138 -0.296 
 [-8.06]*** [-2.00]** [-0.05] [-14.60]*** [-7.00]*** [-3.34]*** 
Crisis x Liquidity ratio (t-1) 0.012 -0.009 0.013 -0.007 0.066 0.132 
 [4.15]*** [-1.04] [0.37] [-1.25] [3.45]*** [1.62] 
Debt overhang -0.002 0.002 0.001 -0.003 0.053 0.034 
 [-0.29] [0.52] [0.06] [-0.25] [3.41]*** [0.90] 
Crisis x Debt overhang -0.026 -0.033 -0.034 -0.023 -0.091 -0.036 
 [-3.22]*** [-5.78]*** [-1.74]* [-1.76]* [-5.44]*** [-0.60] 
Hor. spillover (Top-300) -0.010 -0.004 0.001 0.015 0.012 0.009 
 [-9.61]*** [-2.63]*** [0.34] [8.07]*** [3.19]*** [0.55] 
Crisis x Hor_Top-300 0.008 0.000 0.000 -0.014 -0.014 -0.001 
 [7.07]*** [0.27] [0.01] [-7.04]*** [-3.24]*** [-0.03] 
Backward spillover (Top-300) 0.011 0.057 0.034 0.034 -0.027 0.08 
 [2.35]** [6.14]*** [1.57] [4.23]*** [-1.42] [0.94] 
Crisis x Backward_Top-300 0.002 -0.009 -0.004 0.000 0.034 -0.044 
 [0.72] [-1.72]* [-0.41] [0.03] [3.31]*** [-0.96] 
Forward spillover (Top-300) -0.021 -0.035 -0.027 0.055 0.097 0.056 
 [-5.00]*** [-4.12]*** [-1.37] [7.51]*** [5.36]*** [0.69] 
Crisis x Forward_Top-300 0.018 -0.009 -0.006 -0.09 -0.107 -0.1 
 [5.58]*** [-1.40] [-0.40] [-15.38]*** [-7.28]*** [-1.47] 
Constant 1.077 1.686 1.660 3.149 3.887 4.45 
 [74.63]*** [24.23]*** [6.68]*** [126.64]*** [41.75]*** [12.73]*** 
       
Observations 265,638 33,735 3,772 242,248 19,309 1,081 
R-squared 0.922 0.785 0.784 0.887 0.835 0.784 
Notes: Dependent variable:  Log of column headline variable. Fixed effects estimation. Standard 
errors clustered at industry level. Robust t-statistics in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Table A10: Results accounting for company size, Serbia 
  Employment Investment 
  Small Medium Large Small Medium Large 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
        
Crisis dummy 1.192 1.145 22.067 2.659 5.244 16.612 
 [11.63]*** [1.53] [2.41]** [10.76]*** [4.81]*** [3.01]*** 
Exporter dummy 0.064 -0.142 -1.264 0.067 0.063 -0.057 
 [3.26]*** [-2.59]*** [-1.27] [1.51] [0.52] [-0.07] 
Size (Log empl.) (t-1) 0.534 0.553 0.382 0.505 0.350 0.411 
 [101.34]*** [9.85]*** [0.86] [54.93]*** [7.82]*** [1.97]* 
Log K/L ratio (t-1) 0.016 0.027 0.480 0.157 0.116 0.355 
 [6.55]*** [1.28] [1.57] [24.20]*** [4.55]*** [2.89]*** 
Return on equity (t-1) 0.005 -0.024 -0.014 -0.046 -0.056 0.008 
 [2.98]*** [-1.41] [-0.07] [-11.02]*** [-2.38]** [0.07] 
Crisis x Return on equity (t-1) 0.021 0.034 0.189 0.076 0.086 0.012 
 [10.75]*** [1.70]* [1.01] [16.79]*** [3.45]*** [0.10] 
Interest rate coverage (t-1) 0.013 0.018 0.022 0.056 0.047 0.072 
 [7.31]*** [1.48] [0.18] [13.48]*** [2.31]** [0.84] 
Crisis x Int. rate cover. (t-1) -0.002 0.000 -0.155 0.003 -0.034 -0.018 
 [-0.99] [-0.02] [-1.04] [0.64] [-1.46] [-0.16] 
Liquidity ratio (t-1) -0.001 0.024 -0.238 -0.069 -0.033 0.397 
 [-0.13] [0.45] [-0.32] [-6.25]*** [-0.52] [0.80] 
Crisis x Liquidity ratio (t-1) 0.002 -0.215 -0.202 -0.087 -0.144 -0.649 
 [0.42] [-2.49]** [-0.19] [-7.78]*** [-2.25]** [-0.84] 
Debt overhang 0.004 0.019 0.131 0.050 -0.002 0.011 
 [1.55] [1.82]* [1.33] [9.75]*** [-0.12] [0.13] 
Crisis x Debt overhang -0.029 -0.051 -0.178 -0.027 -0.024 -0.002 
 [-11.30]*** [-3.37]*** [-1.47] [-4.90]*** [-1.19] [-0.02] 
Hor. spillover (Top-300) 0.020 0.025 1.655 0.010 0.009 0.198 
 [5.76]*** [0.88] [3.26]*** [1.27] [0.25] [0.83] 
Crisis x Hor_Top-300 -0.024 -0.041 -1.494 0.002 -0.024 -0.228 
 [-7.61]*** [-1.45] [-2.85]*** [0.32] [-0.74] [-0.98] 
Backward spillover (Top-300) -0.057 0.097 -0.766 0.350 0.121 -0.267 
 [-4.27]*** [0.91] [-0.98] [11.08]*** [0.79] [-0.47] 
Crisis x Backward_Top-300 0.003 -0.018 0.538 -0.017 -0.086 -0.174 
 [1.04] [-0.86] [2.01]* [-2.32]** [-2.89]*** [-1.03] 
Forward spillover (Top-300) 0.025 -0.091 1.879 0.095 0.391 1.444 
 [1.74]* [-0.77] [2.13]** [2.76]*** [2.40]** [2.15]** 
Crisis x Forward_Top-300 -0.099 -0.044 -1.236 -0.247 -0.415 -1.217 
 [-11.17]*** [-0.71] [-1.66] [-11.66]*** [-4.52]*** [-2.52]** 
Constant 0.831 1.745 -23.833 -2.252 -0.997 -10.363 
 [7.90]*** [2.52]** [-2.59]** [-8.88]*** [-0.92] [-1.93]* 
       
Observations 151,929 2,668 87 142,137 2,365 80 
R-squared 0.922 0.812 0.829 0.881 0.888 0.959 
Notes: Dependent variable:  Log of column headline variable. Fixed effects estimation. Standard 
errors clustered at industry level. Robust t-statistics in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
  
Table A11: Results for sales (full model) 
  HR HU BG RO RS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
       
Crisis dummy 0.723 -0.861 0.510 -0.456 0.115 
 [3.56]*** [-4.08]*** [3.97]*** [-16.02]*** [15.61]*** 
Exporter dummy 0.180 0.176   0.338 
 [31.90]*** [17.27]***   [10.47]*** 
Size (Log empl.) (t-1) 1.549 0.481 0.390 0.656 0.443 
 [89.15]*** [107.46]*** [79.43]*** [108.54]*** [76.07]*** 
Log K/L ratio (t-1) 0.219 0.266 0.084 0.304 0.046 
 [49.14]*** [69.36]*** [31.65]*** [60.06]*** [17.46]*** 
Return on equity (t-1) 0.061 0.053 0.103 0.067 0.153 
 [12.07]*** [16.59]*** [26.42]*** [25.45]*** [42.83]*** 
Crisis x Return on equity (t-1) -0.013 -0.006 -0.021 -0.015 -0.042 
 [-1.95]* [-2.00]** [-6.28]*** [-9.04]*** [-13.80]*** 
Interest rate coverage (t-1) 0.013 -0.012 0.017 0.033 0.032 
 [12.76]*** [-4.01]*** [4.47]*** [16.16]*** [12.05]*** 
Crisis x Int. rate cover. (t-1) 0.006 0.018 -0.008 -0.014 0.002 
 [4.84]*** [6.13]*** [-2.11]** [-6.67]*** [0.72] 
Liquidity ratio (t-1) -0.035 0.006 -1.814 -0.016 -0.019 
 [-6.48]*** [1.61] [-25.69]*** [-5.93]*** [-3.57]*** 
Crisis x Liquidity ratio (t-1) 0.007 -0.041 1.714 0.001 -0.015 
 [1.29] [-10.48]*** [16.77]*** [0.31] [-2.74]*** 
Debt overhang -0.028 -0.019 -0.039 -0.126 -0.024 
 [-55.40]*** [-12.10]*** [-21.57]*** [-45.86]*** [-14.64]*** 
Crisis x Debt overhang -0.017 -0.023 -0.033 0.021 -0.038 
 [-28.30]*** [-14.92]*** [-17.63]*** [6.55]*** [-22.47]*** 
Hor. spillover (Top-300) 0.001 0.006 0.009 -0.021 -0.033 
 [0.81] [6.32]*** [4.35]*** [-16.36]*** [-11.65]*** 
Crisis x Hor_Top-300 -0.003 -0.007 -0.012 0.014 0.027 
 [-5.00]*** [-6.67]*** [-5.48]*** [10.25]*** [9.02]*** 
Backward spillover (Top-300) 0.152 -0.099 -0.099 0.077 -0.002 
 [10.68]*** [-6.88]*** [-6.12]*** [8.04]*** [-0.76] 
Crisis x Backward_Top-300 -0.026 -0.001 -0.060 -0.004 0.005 
 [-9.87]*** [-0.20] [-12.67]*** [-1.67]* [1.54] 
Forward spillover (Top-300) -0.149 -0.279 0.106 -0.042 -0.035 
 [-12.81]*** [-15.66]*** [5.60]*** [-23.51]*** [-11.81]*** 
Crisis x Forward_Top-300 -0.018 0.066 0.015 0.050 0.001 
 [-1.95]* [4.65]*** [1.35] [25.34]*** [0.28] 
Constant 8.497 8.748 4.332 2.633 4.568 
 [60.28]*** [35.95]*** [44.68]*** [23.37]*** [330.68]*** 
      
Observations 353,283 551,244 327,667 262,506 206,716 
R-squared 0.914 0.960 0.941 0.942 0.904 
Notes: Dependent variable:  Log of Sales. Fixed effects estimation. Standard errors clustered at 
industry level. Robust t-statistics in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Country abbreviations 
are defined in Table 1. 
 
 
  
Charts 
 
Chart A1: Overall effects of deleveraging the top 300 most indebted firms on a typical firm’s 
sales 
 
Notes: Change in firm’s sales in per cent. Simulation of elimination of 20 per cent, 50 per cent and 
100 per cent of debt overhang by the top 300 most indebted firms on an individual firm’s change in 
sales. Calculations based on estimated elasticities for post-crisis period. 90 per cent confidence 
intervals. 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
Chart A2: Overall effects of deleveraging the top 300 most indebted firms on a typical 
firm’s employment 
 
Notes: Change in firm employment in per cent. Simulation of elimination of 20 per cent, 50 per cent 
and 100 per cent of debt overhang by the top 300 most indebted firms on an individual firm’s change 
in employment. Calculations based on estimated elasticities for post-crisis period. 90 per cent 
confidence intervals. 
Source: Own calculations. 
-4.0 
-2.0 
0.0 
2.0 
4.0 
6.0 
8.0 
2
0
%
 d
e
c
re
a
s
e
 
5
0
%
 d
e
c
re
a
s
e
 
1
0
0
%
 d
e
c
re
a
s
e
 
2
0
%
 d
e
c
re
a
s
e
 
5
0
%
 d
e
c
re
a
s
e
 
1
0
0
%
 d
e
c
re
a
s
e
 
2
0
%
 d
e
c
re
a
s
e
 
5
0
%
 d
e
c
re
a
s
e
 
1
0
0
%
 d
e
c
re
a
s
e
 
2
0
%
 d
e
c
re
a
s
e
 
5
0
%
 d
e
c
re
a
s
e
 
1
0
0
%
 d
e
c
re
a
s
e
 
2
0
%
 d
e
c
re
a
s
e
 
5
0
%
 d
e
c
re
a
s
e
 
1
0
0
%
 d
e
c
re
a
s
e
 
Croatia Hungary Bulgaria Romania Serbia 
-6.0 
-4.0 
-2.0 
0.0 
2.0 
4.0 
6.0 
8.0 
10.0 
2
0
%
 d
e
c
re
a
s
e
 
5
0
%
 d
e
c
re
a
s
e
 
1
0
0
%
 d
e
c
re
a
s
e
 
2
0
%
 d
e
c
re
a
s
e
 
5
0
%
 d
e
c
re
a
s
e
 
1
0
0
%
 d
e
c
re
a
s
e
 
2
0
%
 d
e
c
re
a
s
e
 
5
0
%
 d
e
c
re
a
s
e
 
1
0
0
%
 d
e
c
re
a
s
e
 
2
0
%
 d
e
c
re
a
s
e
 
5
0
%
 d
e
c
re
a
s
e
 
1
0
0
%
 d
e
c
re
a
s
e
 
2
0
%
 d
e
c
re
a
s
e
 
5
0
%
 d
e
c
re
a
s
e
 
1
0
0
%
 d
e
c
re
a
s
e
 
Croatia Hungary Bulgaria Romania Serbia 
Chart A3: Overall effects of deleveraging the top 300 most indebted firms on a typical firm’s 
investment  
 
Notes: Change in firm’s investment in per cent. Simulation of elimination of 20 per cent, 50 per cent 
and 100 per cent of debt overhang by the top 300 most indebted firms on an individual firm’s change 
in investment. Calculations based on estimated elasticities for post-crisis period. 90 per cent 
confidence intervals. 
Source: Own calculations. 
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